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Overview 
Emotion understanding is a key foundation of social skills (e.g. Denham et al., 2003; 
Izard et al., 2001) and thus research into its determinants is a potentially important 
area for clinical and developmental psychology. This thesis investigates the 
development of emotion understanding in young children.  
Part one is a literature review of 23 papers examining the relationship 
between attachment and emotion understanding in children. A summary of the 
papers is presented, before reflections on the meaning of the results. Overall, 
secure attachment appears to be related to superior emotion understanding. 
However, larger, well-controlled studies are needed to better understand the 
association. 
Part two presents an empirical paper focused on the development of a novel 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) paradigm to investigate emotion understanding in 6-
year-old children. The children tested formed part of a cohort of children who had 
taken part in a previous study, in which their attachment to their primary care-giver 
was profiled. The study is the first to demonstrate Event Related Potentials (ERPs) 
associated with emotion understanding in young children. Specifically, a Late 
Positive Potential (LPP) was found to be an index of emotion understanding. The 
paper investigates associations between ERPs and social competence measures, 
and with security of attachment. The empirical research was undertaken with Sarah 
Carman (Carman, 2013). 
Part three provides a critical appraisal of the research process. It considers 
difficulties encountered in producing externally valid research. Issues in the 
development of the EEG paradigm, methodological difficulties in ERP research, and 
measure selection are discussed. 
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Abstract 
Aims 
Emotion understanding is a key foundation of social skills (e.g. Denham et al., 2003; 
Izard et al., 2001) and researchers have suggested that the attachment relationship 
is fundamental in its development (e.g. Harris, 1999). The present paper aimed to 
synthesise and critically appraise the literature investigating this association. 
 
Methods 
Literature databases were searched for studies in peer reviewed journals that 
investigated the relationship between attachment and emotion understanding. 
 
Results 
Twenty-three papers based on twenty-one independent studies were reviewed. 
Seventeen studies reported a relationship between mother-child attachment pattern 
and emotion understanding. In general, secure attachment patterns were related to 
enhanced emotion understanding. Methodological design and measures of 
constructs were variable.  
 
Discussion 
There is evidence for an association between attachment and emotion 
understanding. Studies investigating maternal mind-mindedness and maternal 
mental state language have found that these may be important mediators. Larger, 
well-controlled studies are needed to better understand the relationship. 
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Emotion understanding (or affective mentalising) refers to the ability to accurately 
predict or understand a person’s emotional response based on our understanding of 
the context that the person is in (e.g. Thompson, 1989). Clearly, emotion 
understanding is likely to depend upon emotion recognition, which has been 
subjected to extensive research (e.g. Collin, Bindra, Raju, Gillberg & Minnis, 2013; 
Harms, Martin & Wallace, 2010; Herba and Phillips, 2004). However, emotion 
recognition is just one element of the more complex ability to not just recognise 
emotions, but read behaviour and contexts in such a way that someone’s emotional 
response can be predicted and understood. 
Emotion understanding is related to cognitive Theory of Mind, which refers to 
the ability to understand that other people have thoughts about a situation and that 
others’ cognitions may be different to one’s own (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1991). This is 
typically measured with tasks of false-belief, which require an understanding that it 
is possible for a person to hold a belief about a situation that is different from the 
reality of that situation. In addition, emotion understanding (or emotional Theory of 
Mind) involves knowing that others have inner emotional states that are triggered by 
different contexts and the meanings associated with them, and that emotions imply 
certain behavioural dispositions (e.g. Weimer, Sallquist & Bolnick, 2012).  
As emotion understanding is related to a number of different concepts, so 
the development of emotion understanding is not an all-or-nothing shift from ‘mind-
blindness’ (Baron-Cohen, 1990) to mind-reader. According to the theory of Belief-
Desire Psychology (e.g. Astington, Harris & Olson, 1990; Wellman, 1990), young 
children first learn that actions are informed by a person’s desires (i.e. motivation), 
before learning that a person’s beliefs (i.e. knowledge of a situation) can guide their 
actions (see Wellman & Liu, 2004 for a meta-analysis). 
Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews and Cooke (1989) suggest that 3-year-old 
children are able to understand how desires relate to emotional responses (e.g. you 
want an ice-cream + there is no ice cream = you feel sad), but that at around aged 
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5, children are able to combine their knowledge of desires and beliefs to understand 
another person’s emotional reaction. Thus, understanding whether someone feels 
happy or sad about a false-belief situation requires both knowing what they want 
(desires) and whether they believe that they will get they will get what they want (i.e. 
that person will be happy because they think they are getting ice-cream, which they 
like, even though I know that the box is empty; Harris et al., 1989). Similarly, 
children are able to understand emotions based on desire, such as happiness and 
sadness, before they can understand emotions based on beliefs, such as surprise 
(e.g.  Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991; Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988). Hence, according to this view, more complex emotion understanding is 
dependent on a prior understanding of Theory of Mind.  
Fonagy and Target (1997) suggest that the ability to attribute mental states 
(cognitions and emotions) to others allows children to ascribe meaning to another’s 
behaviour and to predict that behaviour. They explain that “as children learn to 
understand people’s behaviour, they can flexibly activate, from multiple sets of self-
other representations organised on the basis of prior experience, the one(s) best 
suited to respond adaptively to particular interpersonal transactions” (Fonagy & 
Target, 1997, p. 680). Thus, emotion understanding should be a key foundation of 
social skills, and indeed young children’s emotional competence has been shown to 
contribute later social competence (e.g. Denham et al, 2003; Izard et al, 2001). 
Therefore, research into its determinants is a potentially important area for clinical 
and developmental psychology.   
 
Emotion understanding and attachment 
In a review of studies investigating individual differences in understanding emotion, 
Harris (1999) delineated two models of the development of emotion understanding: 
the ‘Psychological Discourse Model’, in which care-giver variation in discourse 
regarding emotion (i.e. the “manner and/or extent that feelings are put into words”; 
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Harris, 1999, p. 307), affects the way that a child is able to ‘encode’ emotional 
events; and the ‘Attachment Status Model’, in which attachment security is directly 
related to children’s emotion understanding (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram illustrating potential models of the development of emotion understanding, from 
Harris (1999). Solid lines indicate causal relationships within the ‘Attachment Status Model’ and the 
dashed line indicates the causal relationship between psychological discourse and emotion 
understanding in the ‘Psychological Discourse Model’.  
According to the Psychological Discourse model, children who are in 
environments in which emotions and mental states are discussed, have greater 
understanding of mental states (see also Denham, Zoller & Couchoud, 1994; Meins, 
1999). Symons (2004) posits that this occurs through a process of internalisation (as 
discussed by Lloyd & Fernyhough, 1999; Vygotsky, 1978), in which “some 
representational understanding of the language also takes place” (p. 167). 
Language thus provides a route by which emotional situations can be organised and 
appraised. Eventually, the child is able to provide structure to emotional events in 
the absence of another person’s discourse (Symons, 2004).  
Within the Attachment Status Model, variation in caregiver sensitivity is 
related to the mother-infant attachment relationship (e.g. de Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 
Psychological 
Discourse Model 
Attachment 
Status Model 
Sensitivity of caregiver 
Attachment status of child 
Coherent psychological 
discourse of caregiver 
Child’s understanding of 
emotion 
Wider social encounters 
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1997; van IJzendoorn, Juffer & Duyvesteyn, 1995). Sensitive parents are able to 
notice their child’s needs and respond appropriately (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & 
Wall, 1978).  Although this model includes psychological discourse, it links this to 
caregiving sensitivity and attachment status, but not directly to emotion 
understanding. Thus, within this model, attachment status is presumed to be the key 
causal link associated with individual differences in emotion understanding. Harris 
(1999) postulated that the relationship between attachment status and emotion 
understanding may then be either direct, or mediated through another variable, such 
as ‘wider social encounters’ (Figure 1); i.e. securely attached children are likely to 
have more friends and thus more opportunities for learning about emotion within the 
social environment. 
Fonagy and Target (1997) propose that within a secure attachment 
relationship, the caregiver is able to reflect back the infant’s mental state. Over time, 
the infant learns that the caregiver’s reaction is related to the infant’s own internal 
state (beliefs or desires). Accordingly, within a secure attachment relationship, the 
caregiver will both “recognise and reflect back the child’s experience” (Harris, 1999, 
p. 315), and “help the child contain and cope with that experience” (Harris, 1999, p. 
315). According to this proposal, children with secure attachments thus feel safer to 
explore negative emotions, as they are able to better cope with them (Fonagy & 
Target, 1997).  
On this basis, Harris (1999) hypothesised that differences between securely 
and insecurely attached children in emotion understanding should be thus more 
apparent in situations that may be threatening or anxiety provoking (i.e. in situations 
in which the attachment system may be activated), and that securely attached 
children should perform better in these situations (the ‘diminished lexicon for 
emotion’ hypothesis). Consistent with this theory, Laible and Thompson (1998) 
found secure attachment to be associated with better understanding of negative, but 
not positive, emotions. However, this was only true of one specific facet of emotion 
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understanding; being able to explain the reasons behind the emotion. It was not 
related to accurate emotion recognition. In contrast to Harris’ hypothesis, Belsky, 
Spritz and Crnic (1996) have suggested that insecurely attached children 
experience more negative events and are therefore more attuned to negative 
emotions. This may suggest that insecurely attached children should perform better 
on tests of the understanding of negative emotions (the ‘hypervigilance’ hypothesis).  
Harris (1999) suggested that “there is some way to go before the proposed 
relationship between attachment security and emotion understanding is established 
and understood” (p. 315). Since that time, a number of studies have further 
investigated the relationship, using experimental and observational paradigms, and 
these have begun to be collated into reviews (e.g. Pavarini, de Hollanda Souza & 
Hawk, 2012; Symons, 2004). 
In a narrative review of the development of Theory of Mind, Symons (2004) 
summarised the results of studies investigating the relationship between attachment 
status and Theory of Mind. He discussed that although self-other understanding has 
been show to relate to concurrent attachment pattern, there is less evidence of this 
in longitudinal studies, which investigate early attachment security and later social 
understanding. Rather, he suggests that common parenting processes underlying 
attachment and Theory of Mind, such as parental discourse and maternal mind-
mindedness, are key in the development of social understanding.  
Similarly, a recent systematic review investigating parental practices and 
Theory of Mind development, including 18 studies related to attachment, found that 
children with secure attachment relationships were better at false-belief and emotion 
comprehension tasks than children with insecure attachment relationships (Pavarini 
et al., 2012), but that mediating variables need to be taken into consideration. 
Moreover, the authors state that discourse about mental state, past events, and 
maternal mind-mindedness (mother’s awareness of their child’s mental states; 
Meins, 1997) have all been found to mediate, moderate and in some cases fully 
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explain, the relationship between attachment and Theory of Mind development (e.g.  
Laranjo, Bernier, Meins & Carlson, 2010; McQuaid, Bigelow, McLaughlin & 
MacLean, 2008; Meins et al., 2002; Ontai & Thompson, 2008; Raikes and 
Thompson, 2006).  
Pavarini and colleagues (2012) suggest that, given these findings, “it seems 
more fruitful to focus on specific features of parent-child interaction on children’s 
understanding of mental states, rather than general effects of attachment on theory-
of-mind development” (p. 3). They therefore discuss studies investigating the effect 
of maternal sensitivity and maternal discourse styles, as opposed to attachment 
security, on emotion understanding for the remainder of their review. However, we 
consider that there is good reason to continue to investigate the relationship 
between attachment and emotion understanding. Firstly, Pavarini and colleagues 
(2012) cite only five studies that found effects of other parenting variables, to explain 
the attachment relationship. This is not enough to conclusively say that attachment 
is not important. Secondly, a full understanding of the relationship between 
attachment and all aspects of emotion understanding may have important 
implications for attachment theory. This includes thorough analysis of the differential 
effects for different types of emotional state, an aspect which Pavarini and 
colleagues (2012) did not address.  
Reviews to date have taken a narrow approach to the definition of emotion 
understanding; for example, Pavarini and colleagues (2012) do not discuss studies 
investigating the relationship between attachment and emotion recognition. We 
would argue that the ability to recognise emotions is a key factor in being able to 
understand emotional states in others. Before one can understand why a person 
may be feeling a certain emotion, one first needs to recognise what the emotion is. 
Furthermore, according to belief-desire psychology, recognition of certain emotional 
states, such as surprise, requires knowledge of beliefs, and thus some level of 
Theory of Mind (e.g.  Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991; Wellman 
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& Bartsch, 1988). Thus, if attachment is related to only certain aspects of emotion 
understanding, we may expect differences in the relationship between attachment 
and different emotional expressions (those requiring knowledge of beliefs versus 
those requiring knowledge of desires).  
Moreover, this may have implications for theories regarding the role of 
attachment in emotion understanding – Harris (1999) suggests that Laible and 
Thompson’s (1998) findings provide evidence that attachment security is related to 
the ability to explore, rather than to recognise, emotions, as per Fonagy and Target 
(1997). Given that previous studies have found a discrepancy in the relationship 
between attachment and emotion recognition versus understanding the causes of 
emotions (e.g. Laible and Thompson, 1998), it seems pertinent to review whether 
research to date provides evidence for or against this view. Thus, papers 
investigating the relationship between attachment and emotion recognition are 
included in the present review. 
The aims of the current review were therefore two-fold: 1) to 
comprehensively collate all papers investigating the relationship between 
attachment and emotion understanding, and 2) to better understand the relationship 
between attachment and the various facets of emotion understanding, including 
emotion recognition. Aim two subsumes a number of additional questions, as 
follows: 
1. How has emotion understanding been measured in studies to date? 
2. Is there a consistent relationship between attachment and emotion 
understanding? 
3. If so, are there differences between different areas of emotion understanding 
(e.g. recognition, cognitive Theory of Mind and emotional Theory of Mind)? 
4. Is attachment differentially related to different valences of emotions (positive 
or negative), which may provide evidence for competing hypotheses 
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regarding the nature of the relationship between attachment pattern and 
emotion understanding? 
 
Methods 
A search of the literature covering attachment and emotion understanding was 
conducted using PsycINFO and PubMed databases. Reference lists of retrieved 
articles were also manually searched for relevant publications. All papers 
investigating the relationship between attachment patterns and emotion 
understanding in typically developing children, up to and including age 12 years old 
were evaluated. In order to capture all relevant studies, and given the proposed 
association between cognitive Theory of Mind and emotion understanding (e.g. 
Harris et al., 1989), papers investigating emotion understanding, mentalisation, 
cognitive Theory of Mind (including false-belief) and emotion recognition were 
included within the search. 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
The search was limited to empirical papers published in English in peer reviewed 
journals up to 2012. Studies were included if they measured attachment and an 
aspect related to emotion understanding, including emotion recognition, cognitive 
Theory of Mind and emotional Theory of Mind.  We included all study types, 
including cross-sectional and longitudinal, and those using only questionnaire 
measures as well as those using experimental paradigms. Only studies of typically 
developing children and in which attachment patterns were directly measured 
(through use of parent report, observation, structured or non-structured task) and 
reported were included. Thus, papers referring to ‘mother-child interaction’, or 
similar, but which did not report attachment pattern, were excluded from the search.  
Studies investigating emotion regulation were also excluded, as this relates to the 
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ability to regulate one’s own emotions, and not the ability to understand the 
emotions of another (e.g. Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002). 
The search strategy aimed to identify all research in which attachment was 
investigated alongside emotion understanding. The search terms were ‘Attachment’ 
along with Emotion* Understand*, Social Cognition, Theory of Mind, Affect 
Understand*, Affect Comprehen*, Emotion Recogni*, Mentalis*, Facial Expression, 
Emotion* Expression, Social Understand*, Understand* Feeling*, False*, False 
Belief, where * denotes truncated terms. 
 
Search Results 
The initial search strategy identified 221 papers. Following removal of duplicates, 
the titles, and, where necessary, abstracts, were read to identify studies broadly 
within the relevant area. Where titles and abstracts did not provide the required 
information, full papers were accessed for detailed review. The remaining papers 
were read in full and those meeting the search inclusion criteria were included in the 
formal review. Figure 2 illustrates the number of papers included at each stage of 
the review process, following the PRISMA (2009) Flow Diagram guidelines (Moher, 
Liberati, Tetzlaff & Altman, 2009).  
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Figure 2. PRISMA (2009) flow diagram illustrating numbers of articles identified at each stage of the 
literature search.  
 
Results 
Twenty-three papers met the inclusion criteria and are included in the present 
review. Eleven were cross-sectional (Table 1) and twelve were longitudinal designs 
(Table 2). Of the longitudinal papers, 2 were follow-ups of the same cohorts of 
children (Raikes & Thompson, 2008 was a follow up study of the Raikes & 
Thompson, 2006 cohort and Steele, Steele & Croft, 2008 was a follow up of the 
Steele, Steele, Croft & Fonagy, 1999 cohort), giving a total of 21 independent 
studies.  Tables 1 and 2 describe the sample characteristics of these studies. 
Fourteen studies investigated white middle class populations, although a 
sizeable minority studied more disadvantaged groups. Notably, Barone and Lionetti 
(2011) studied a group of adopted children and Raikes and Thompson (2006, 2008) 
studied children who were enrolled in the US Early Head Start programme. This is a 
programme of services for children from low-income families. Arranz, Artamendi, 
Olabarrietta and Martin (2002) excluded children from high risk families. By design, 
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all studies assessed were English language; thus, unsurprisingly 18 studies took 
place in the UK, USA or Canada, with the remaining studying populations from 
Australia and Western Europe.  A wide range of age groups of children were 
studied. The age of completion of emotion understanding tasks ranged from 26.4 
months (Laranjo et al., 2010) to 132 months (Steele et al., 2008). Studies reported 
roughly equal male:female ratios.  
 
Attachment measures 
Eleven studies used assessments of attachment which provide categorical 
outcomes, and twelve used assessments which produce data on a continuum 
(Tables 3, 4, 5 & 6). Inter-rater reliability was generally good, with Cohen’s ĸ figures 
ranging from around ĸ = 0.7 (e.g. Barone & Lionetti, 2011) to 1.0 (e.g. McQuaid et 
al., 2008). Only four studies (Arranz et al., 2002; De Rosnay & Harris, 2002; Laible 
& Thompson, 1998; Steele, Steele & Johansson, 2002) did not report inter-rater 
reliabilities for attachment assessments. 
 
Continuum measures 
Eight studies (Laranjo et al., 2010; Laible & Thompson, 1998; Ontai & Thompson, 
2002; Ontai & Thompson, 2008; Raikes & Thompson, 2006; Raikes & Thompson, 
2008; Symons & Clark, 2000; Waters et al., 2009) used versions of the Attachment 
Q-Sort (AQS;  Waters & Deane, 1985) to record attachment patterns. This involves 
a rater coding parent-child interaction in observations of a number of different 
situations. The child is rated on a continuum for a number of attachment related 
behaviours, using cards which can be ranked in piles from ‘most descriptive of the 
subject’ to ‘least descriptive of the subject’. The AQS Score is the correlation 
between this child and the prototypical ‘secure’ child. The observer report has good 
convergent validity with the Strange Situation (Van Ijzendoorn, Vereijken, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg & Riksen-Walraen, 2004). Van Ijzendoorn and colleagues’ 
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(2004) meta-analysis suggested that the self (parent) - report version of the AQS is 
not a valid measure of attachment, however. Despite this, four studies have used 
this version (Ontai & Thompson, 2002; Laible & Thompson, 1998; Laranjo et al., 
2010) and so the results of attachment security need to be treated with caution.  
The AQS has a number of benefits; it can be carried out in the home and is 
therefore used in a naturalistic setting, which may produce more ecologically valid 
results and is less intrusive for the child and parent. It can also be used with a 
broader age range of children than the Strange Situation and is therefore useful for 
cross-sectional studies of older participants. However, a potential drawback is that it 
cannot be used to classify attachment types; it only rates children on a scale of 
security-insecurity. It was also not designed to assess disorganisation.  
 
 
Table 1 
Longitudinal Studies Investigating the Relationship between Attachment and Emotion Understanding in Children: Sample Characteristics 
Paper Type of Study n (children) Number of 
Males (% of n) 
Mean Age 
(months) 
Ethnic/Social Background Country 
Barone & Lionetti 
(2011) 
Longitudinal 20 16 (75) 
Time 1: 3.9      
Time 2: 12-18 
months post T1 
Time 3: 12 months 
post T2 
Children adopted between 36-60 
months old 
Italy 
Laranjo, Bernier, 
Meins & Carlson 
(2010) 
Longitudinal 61 25 (41) 
Time 1: 12.9   
Time 2: 15.6   
Time 3: 26.4 
Majority college degree and 
Caucasian 
Canada 
McElwain & Volling 
(2004) 
Longitudinal 30 14 (47) 
Time 1: 12      
Time 2: 51 
Predominantly Caucasian, mean 
16.5 years maternal education 
At least 1 older sibling 
USA 
Meins, Fernyhough, 
Russell & Clark-Carter 
(1998) 
Longitudinal 
Time 1: 33               
Time 2: 30               
Time 3: 25               
Time 4: 33 
Time 1: 20 (61)        
Time 2: 20 (67)      
Time 3: 14 (56)       
Time 4: 20 (61) 
Time 0: 11 or 13 
Time 1: 31      
Time 2: 37      
Time 3: 49      
Time 4: 61.5 
Time 1: 13 group1. 20 group 2
+ 
Time 2: 12 group 1,  18 group 2 
Time 3: 8 group 1, 17 group 2   
Time 4: 23 group 1, 20 group 2    
UK 
Meins, Fernyhough, 
Wainwright, Das 
Gupta, Fradley 
&Tuckey (2002) 
Longitudinal 57 29 (51) 
Time 1: 6        
Time 2: 12       
Time 3: 45.8    
Time 4: 48.3       
Predominantly white UK 
Ontai & Thompson 
(2002) 
Longitudinal 
Time 1: 52               
Time 2: 29 
Time 1: 25 (48)                 
Time 2: 13 (45) 
Time 1: 41.2                   
Time 2: 60.84      
Predominantly European 
American, middle class 
USA 
Raikes &Thompson 
(2006) 
Longitudinal 42 20 (48) 
Time1: 28                
Time 2: 42 
Predominantly white working class 
(enrolled in Early Head Start) 
USA 
Raikes & Thompson 
(2008) 
Longitudinal 42 20 (48) 
Time 1: 28        
Time 2: 42 
Predominantly white working class 
(enrolled in Early Head Start) 
USA 
 
 
Steele, Steele & Croft 
(2008) 
Longitudinal   
Time 1,2,3: 96               
Time 4: 63               
Time 5: 49 
Time 4: 34 (54)           
Time 5: 24 
Time 1: pregnancy 
Time 2: 12      
Time 3: 18      
Time 4: 72       
Time 5: 132             
95% white middle class, 70% 
parental university degrees 
UK 
Steele, Steele, Croft  & 
Fonagy (1999)  
Longitudinal  63 29 (46) 
Time 1: pregnancy 
Time 2: 12       
Time 3: 18       
Time 4: 70.7 
95% white middle class, 70% 
parental university degrees 
UK 
Steele, Steele & 
Johansson (2002) 
Longitudinal   Time 3: 51 Time 3: 25 (49) 
Time 1: pregnancy                          
Time 2: 12      
Time 3: 18      
Time 4: 136.8 
Predominantly white middle class.                        UK
Symons & Clark (2000) Longitudinal 
Time 1: 57               
Time 2: 46                          
Time 2: 26 (56) 
Time 1: 25.1        
Time 2: 69.5  
Wide range of SES, Blishen Score 
mean = 44.3* 
Canada 
 
* Blishen Score: socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada (Blishen, Carroll & Moore, 1987). The Blishen scale assigns SES codes to the occupations listed in the 1981 
Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations. At the time of the original scale, Over the 514 Census occupations, the index has a mean of 42.74, a standard deviation 
of 13.28, a minimum of 17.81, and a maximum of 101.74. 
 
+ 
Measure of socioeconomic status in UK, as proposed by Mueller and Parcell (1981); Group1 = Unskilled/Manual workers, Group 2 = Professional workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
 
Cross-sectional Studies Investigating the Relationship between Attachment and Emotion Understanding in Children: Sample Characteristics 
Paper Type of Study n (children) Number of 
Males (% of n) 
Mean Age 
(months) 
Ethnic/Social Background Country 
Arranz, Artamendi, 
Olabarrieta & Martine 
(2002) 
Cross-sectional 114 54 (47) 44.6 
Predominantly middle level of 
parental education 
Spain 
Colle & Del Giudice 
(2011) 
Cross-sectional 122 51 (42) 86.4 Predominantly middle class Italy 
De Rosnay & Harris 
(2002) 
Cross-sectional 51 25 (49) 60.9 
Mixture of middle, lower- middle 
and working class families 
UK 
Fonagy, Redfern & 
Charman (1997) 
Cross-sectional 77 33 (43) 58 
Predominantly white working and 
lower middle class 
UK 
Greig & Howe (2001) Cross-sectional 45 24 (53) 40 
Predominantly white working class 
(26 group 1, 19 group 2
+
) 
UK 
Kidwell, Young, 
Hinkle, Ratliff, Marcum 
& Martin (2010) 
Cross-sectional 54 31 (57) 54 
Over 90% Caucasian. 56% 
receiving public assistance 
USA 
Laible & Thompson 
(1998) 
Cross-sectional 40 20 (50) 50.4 Primarily middle class Caucasian UK 
McQuaid, Bigelow, 
McLaughlin & 
MacLean (2008) 
Cross-sectional 33 19 (58) 57 
All non-Hispanic white. Blishen 
Score mean 46.02* 
Canada 
Ontai &Thompson 
(2008) 
Cross-sectional 78 36 (45) 53.76 Predominantly white middle class USA 
 
 
Repacholi &Trapolini 
(2004) 
Cross-Sectional 48 24 (50) 53.98 
Predominantly Caucasian middle 
class 
Australia 
Waters, Virmani, 
Thompson, Meyer, 
Raikes & Jochem 
(2009) 
Cross-sectional 73 40 (55) 54.24 
Ethnically and socioeconomically 
diverse 
USA 
 
* Blishen Score: socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada (Blishen, Carroll & Moore, 1987). The Blishen scale assigns SES codes to the occupations listed in the 1981 
Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations. At the time of the original scale, Over the 514 Census occupations, the index has a mean of 42.74, a standard deviation 
of 13.28, a minimum of 17.81, and a maximum of 101.74. 
 
+ 
Measure of socioeconomic status in UK, as proposed by Mueller and Parcell (1981); Group1 = Unskilled/Manual workers, Group 2 = Professional workers 
25 
 
 
Categorical measures 
The Strange Situation (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970; Ainsworth et al., 1978), one of the 
most well-validated measures of attachment security, was also used in some 
studies. The original version is validated for children aged between 12 and 18 
months and as such, was only used in longitudinal studies, where the attachment 
pattern was profiled some months/years before emotion understanding ability 
(Meins, Fernyhough, Russell & Clark-Carter, 1998; Meins et al., 2002; Steele et al., 
1999, 2002, 2008). One study (Kidwell et al., 2010), used the Preschool Strange 
Situation (Cassidy & Marvin, 1992), which has been specifically developed for older 
children. McQuaid and colleagues (2008) used a non-validated videotape measure 
of mother-child reunions and separations, coded using the validated Crittenden’s 
Preschool Assessment of Attachment (PAA) method (Crittenden, 1992). This 
involves classifying children into a broader range of attachment patterns than the 
traditional Ainsworth Strange Situation classificatory method. These measures have 
the advantage of being able to classify different attachment patterns, including 
assessment for disorganisation. However, despite good internal validity, these types 
of assessment may be distressing for mother and child, and if used within the 
laboratory, may have poorer ecological validity than the AQS. 
A number also used narrative story stem techniques, which involve children 
completing an attachment themed story with dolls or pictures. The Attachment Story 
Completion Task (ASCT; Bretherton, Ridgeway & Cassidy, 1990), Manchester Child 
Attachment Story Task (MCAST; Green, Stanley, Smith & Goldwyn, 2000) and 
Separation Anxiety Test (SAT; Klagsbrun & Bowlby, 1976) were used, which are all 
validated measures of attachment (e.g. Bretherton et al., 1990; Goldwyn, Stanley, 
Smith & Green, 2000; Shouldice & Stevenson-Hinde, 1992).  
One difficulty with using such assessment types within studies of emotion 
understanding is that they require some degree of Theory of Mind, as the child is 
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expected to ‘pretend’ to be a character within the stories, or to imagine what 
characters would think, feel or do. There would therefore arguably be a degree of 
overlap within performance on these tests and performance on tasks of emotion 
understanding.  Children may also perform better on these assessments if they 
understand emotions better, and thus this may confound their use within research 
assessing emotion understanding. However, they are usually not ‘marked’ in the 
same way as tests of emotion comprehension – the information generated is more 
qualitative in nature. Never-the-less, it may be assumed that a child who struggles 
with Theory of Mind, or understanding of emotion, may struggle to generate material 
for attachment themed stories, regardless of their attachment status. 
Of those studies using categorical assessments of attachment pattern, most 
found a majority of secure attachment patterns, which is consistent with the 
populations studied. A small minority of children showed disorganised attachment 
patterns. Steele and colleagues (1999) re-classified disorganised children into other 
attachment groups for the purposes of analysis, and McElwain and Volling (2004) 
did not assess for disorganisation as they state that the disorganised category was 
not used consistently at the time their data was collected. There is therefore limited 
potential for assessing whether disorganisation has a role to play in the association 
of attachment with emotion understanding. One study (De Rosnay & Harris, 2002) 
did not report attachment patterns for the whole sample, instead splitting them for 
children who did and did not pass various emotion understanding tasks. In all but 
three (McElwain & Volling, 2004; Steele et al., 1999; Steele et al., 2002) of the 
studies, the primary care-giver assessed was the mother; investigation of father-
infant attachment is limited (as in other areas of attachment research), and this is a 
potential avenue for future studies to explore. 
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The relationship between attachment and emotion understanding 
For the purposes of this review, the tasks have been split into three main areas: 
pure emotion recognition tasks, cognitive Theory of Mind tasks and emotional 
Theory of Mind tasks. Some studies did not fit into these discrete categories. We 
have termed these studies ‘mixed mind and emotion’.  Only three studies (Repacholi 
& Trapolini, 2004; McQuaid et al., 2008; Meins et al., 1998) explicitly mentioned that 
the emotion understanding task was scored by a researcher blind to the child’s 
attachment status, all of which found some effect of attachment on emotion 
understanding. Of the 6 out of 21 studies reporting inter-rater reliability for emotion 
understanding/Theory of Mind tasks (Colle & Del Giudice, 2011; Kidwell et al., 2010; 
Laible & Thompson, 1998; McQuaid et al., 2008; Meins et al., 2002; Repacholi & 
Trapolini, 2004), reliability was acceptable.  
 
Emotion recognition tasks 
Two studies used tasks of pure emotion recognition (Table 3); both used tasks 
developed specifically for the research in question and report good inter-rater 
reliabilities. Steele and colleagues (2008) conducted a longitudinal study in which 
attachment was assessed using the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978) when 
the infant was 12 months old, and emotion understanding was measured at 6 and 
11 years. They used an emotion judgement task in which children were shown nine 
simplified line drawings of facial expressions – six basic expressions (fear, anger, 
sadness, disgust, happiness, surprise) and two expressions of complex or mixed 
emotions (mischief and disappointment). At 6-years-old, participants were asked to 
say one or more words to describe the face. At 11-years-old, they were asked to 
write down a word or phrase that described the face. Responses were coded as 
correct or incorrect, and a total accuracy score for responses across all nine faces 
was calculated. Descriptions were audio-recorded and transcribed. Results 
28 
 
 
demonstrated that children with insecure infant-mother attachments, although not 
disorganised attachment patterns, performed worse on the task of verbal emotion 
labelling. The effect was stronger at age 6 than at age 11 years, and was 
statistically significant only at 6 years old. Interestingly, insecure children were 
particularly poor at identifying positive emotions. Infant-father attachment measured 
at 18 months was not related to performance.  
Colle and Del Giudice (2011) were the only researchers to investigate 
recognition of moving rather than static facial expressions. Two tasks of emotion 
recognition were given, each made up of 14 items (10 negative emotions and 4 
positive). The researchers aimed to separate out verbal and non-verbal aspects of 
emotion recognition. Thus the first task was non-verbal discrimination. The child was 
shown a video clip in the middle and four around the periphery of the screen. They 
were asked to find the person in the periphery who feels the same as the one in the 
centre. The second task was emotion labelling; the child was simply asked ‘how do 
you think this person is feeling’. It could be argued that this is a more naturalistic 
task than that of Steele and colleagues (2008), as it used moving images of real 
people, as opposed to simplified cartoon images. Attachment was measured 
concurrently, using the Manchester Child Attachment Story Task (MCAST; Goldwyn 
et al., 2000; Green et al., 2000). The researchers found no effect of concurrent 
attachment on the verbal emotion description (labelling) task, however there was an 
effect of attachment on the non-verbal emotion discrimination task, both assessed at 
7-years-old (disorganised children scored lower than the other attachment groups). 
This may be because the average age of these children was slightly older, given 
that the results from the Steele and colleagues (2008) study were only significant for 
children age 6, and not at age 11.  
 
 
Table 3 
Articles Investigating the Relationship between Attachment and Emotion Recognition in Children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper Attachment Measure 
(age in months) 
Number of Securely and 
insecurely Attached 
Children (Secure %, 
Insecure %, 
Disorganised % for 
categorical) 
Emotion Understanding 
Measure (age in months) 
Significant Relationship 
between Attachment and 
Emotion Understanding? 
Other Key Variables 
Associated with Emotion 
Understanding 
Colle & Del Giudice 
(2011) 
Manchester Child 
Attachment Story task 
(MCAST; Goldwyn, et al., 
2000; Green et al., 2000) 
(84) 
54, 30, 16 
Non-verbal discrimination 
task                                   
Emotional labelling task 
(84) 
Yes (non-verbal task)     
No (verbal task)               
Gender (girls > boys)             
Steele, Steele & Croft 
(2008) 
Strange Situation at 12 
months 
 
6 year follow up: 57, 35, 8 
11 year follow up: 58, 36, 
8 
  
Emotion Judgement Task  
at 6 and 11 years 
Yes at 6 years, trend level 
at 11 years 
Gender (girls > boys) 
(Parental and child verbal 
abilities, and father-infant 
attachment not 
associated) 
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Cognitive Theory of Mind tasks: 
Although a number of studies investigated Theory of Mind, fewer used tasks that did 
not contain an emotional component (Table 4). Cognitive Theory of Mind tasks have 
generally been shown to have good reliability across a wide range of ages (e.g. 
Hughes et al., 2000). Three studies (Greig and Howe, 2001; Meins et al., 2002; 
Repacholi and Trapolini, 2004) used versions of a standard false-belief task 
developed by Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) known as ‘the Smartie Task’, in 
which the child is shown a Smartie Tube and then sees that it is filled with pencils, 
rather than chocolate. The child is then asked where a character will look for the 
Smarties and whether they are really there or not.  
Tasks of unexpected identity (where an item looks like something else) were 
also used (Meins et al., 1998, 2002; Repacholi and Trapolini, 2004). In addition, 
McElwain and Volling (2004) and Meins and colleagues (1998, 2002)  used tasks of 
unexpected transfer, in which an object is moved out of sight of a character, and the 
character comes back to look for it. Laranjo and colleagues (2010) used the 
‘Discrepant Desires’ task (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), which involved the child 
needing to give the experimenter (i.e. a stranger) a book to read; it required the child 
to understand that the experimenter wanted to read a different book than they would 
want to read themselves. They also used the ‘Visual Perspectives’ task, which 
required the child to understand what his/her mother could see in order to show 
them a toy.  
McElwain and Volling (2004) and Meins and colleagues (1998) found 
performance on an unexpected transfer task at age four was significantly better in 
children with secure attachments, assessed using the Strange Situation (Ainsworth 
et al., 1978) at one year. Maternal sensitivity (McElwain & Volling, 2004; Meins et 
al., 1998) and mothers’ tendency to describe their child in terms of their ‘mental’ 
attributes (e.g. ‘caring’; Meins et al., 1998) were also significantly related to 
performance, as well as to attachment status. Meins and colleagues (1998) did not 
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find significant difference between attachment groups on a false-belief task at age 
five, however. 
Repacholi and Trapolini (2004) found that the concurrent attachment 
dimension of the self-Separation Anxiety Test - Seattle Version (self-SAT; Klagsbrun 
& Bowlby, 1976; Slough & Greenberg, 1990) was positively correlated with false-
belief score (both assessed at 4 years old), even when age and gender were 
controlled for. Age and language were also both significant independent predictors. 
Greater differences between different attachment patterns were seen for the task 
involving an attachment figure (visual perspectives) compared to the task involving a 
stranger (discrepant desires).  
Repacholi and Trapolini (2004) also investigated children’s understanding of 
the causes of emotions. Interestingly, scores on the Theory of Mind and ‘pure’ 
emotion understanding tasks were not significantly correlated. The emotion task 
used was a modified ‘causes of emotions’ interview (Dunn & Hughes, 1998), in 
which children were asked to identify the expression and possible antecedents of 
this for four child’s faces, four mother’s faces and four unknown female’s faces. 
Children were most competent at explaining causes of their own emotions, followed 
by their mother’s, and least competent in explaining the stranger’s emotion. Results 
demonstrated that the attachment dimension of the SAT was a significant 
independent predictor of performance on the emotion understanding task. Unlike the 
Theory of Mind task, there was no relationship between attachment security and 
differential performance for identifying the emotions of different people. 
Laranjo and colleagues (2010) also found a small (but non-significant) 
longitudinal effect of attachment security (assessed with the Observer Attachment 
Q-Sort; AQS, Waters & Deane, 1985) at 15.6 months, on their task involving the 
mother’s perspective (visual perspective task; assessed 10 months later), once 
children’s expressive language was controlled for. There was no effect for the 
Discrepant Desires task, involving a stranger, however. When the genders were 
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separated, there was a significant effect of attachment on the visual perspective 
task for boys, but not girls, with more securely attached boys performing better on 
this task. Maternal mind-mindedness (in particular, mothers’ references to desires) 
was related to performance in both tasks for the whole sample. However, the effects 
of mind-mindedness and attachment on performance were not considered together 
within one analysis, and thus it is difficult to conclude whether attachment would still 
have been a significant predictor had mind-mindedness been controlled for.  
Similarly, Meins and colleagues (2002) found that mothers’ appropriate 
mental state comments (assessed when the child was 6 months old), and child 
verbal abilities (assessed at 45 months), but not attachment status (assessed using 
the Strange Situation at 12 months old), were related to performance on Theory of 
Mind tasks at 45 months old. Greig and Howe (2001) also found no relationship 
when attachment (assessed with the Attachment Story Completion task; Bretherton 
et al., 1990) and false-belief understanding were assessed concurrently at 3 years 
old. Repacholi and Trapolini (2004) stated that this may be because Greig and 
Howe (2001) tested younger children, who are ‘more likely to either consistently fail 
the false-belief or to perform at chance levels’.  
Arranz and colleagues (2002) found that performance on a false-belief task 
at 3 to 4 years old was significantly associated with attachment assessed 
concurrently with the Spanish version of the Attachment Story Completion task 
(Bretherton et al., 1990), with more secure children performing better. 
 
 
Table 4 
Articles Investigating the Relationship between Attachment and Cognitive Theory of Mind in Children 
Paper Attachment Measure 
(age in months) 
Number of Securely and 
Insecurely Attached 
Children (Secure %, 
Insecure %, 
Disorganised % for 
Categorical) 
Emotion Understanding 
Measure (age in months) 
Significant Relationship 
between Attachment and 
Emotion Understanding? 
Other Key Variables 
Associated with Emotion 
Understanding  
Arranz, Artamendi, 
Olabarrieta & Martine 
(2002) 
Attachment Story 
Completion (Bretherton et 
al., 1990) (Spanish 
Version) (44.6) 
56.1, 32.5                
missing cases - 11.4% 
False-belief Tasks:                                                 
Wellman's belief-desire 
psychology (44.6)   
Max and the chocolate 
task (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) (44.6)                      
Yes 
No relation to family size 
or number of siblings 
Greig & Howe (2001) 
 
Attachment Story 
Completion (Bretherton et 
al., 1990) (40) 
45, 36, 18 
Emotion Understanding 
Task (Denham & 
Auerbach, 1995)                                                        
False-belief Task (Bartsch 
and Wellman, 1989) (40) 
Yes for emotion task      
No for false-belief task 
Maternal depression       
Child verbal mental age 
Laranjo, Bernier, Meins 
& Carlson (2010) 
Observer Attachment Q-
Sort (15.6) 
M=.47                            
SD =.25                     
Range -.28 - .82 
 
 
Discrepant  desires 
(adapted from Repacholi & 
Gopnik, 1997) (26)           
Visual perspectives 
(Carlson et al., 2004) (26) 
No. Marginal trend for 
visual perspectives after 
control for expressive 
language 
Maternal mind-
mindedness           
Unrelated to maternal 
education, older sibs, 
gender, age, language 
McElwain & Volling 
(2004) 
Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth et al.. 1978), 
assessed on a continuous 
scale as per Main, Kaplan 
& Cassidy (1985) (12) 
Mothers:19, 11       
Fathers: 17, 13 
disorganised not used 
False-belief: two trials of 
the ‘Sally-Ann’ task 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith, 1985) (51) 
Yes (but only marginally 
significant if sex added as 
a covariate) 
Parental sensitivity (but 
only marginally significant 
if sex added as a 
covariate). Main effects of 
parent (mother/Father) 
and sex not significant 
Meins, Fernyhough, 
Russell & Clark-Carter 
(1998) 
Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth et al., 1978) 
(11 or 13) 
T1: 58, 30, 12                
T2: 57, 43                      
T3: 60, 40                      
T4: 58,30,12 
                                                
 
Unexpected Transfer Task 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983) 
at 4 years (T3) 
Picture identification task 
& False-belief and emotion 
task at 5 years (T4) 
Yes at 4 years 
Yes for picture 
identification task at 5 
years 
No for false-belief and 
emotion task at 5 years 
Child executive 
capacity(T1) 
Maternal tutoring 
sensitivity (T2) 
Maternal focus on mental 
description of children (T2) 
 
 
Meins, Fernyhough, 
Wainwright, Das Gupta , 
Fradley &Tuckey (2002) 
Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth, 1978) (12) 
67, 26, 7 
 
The appearance-reality 
task (Flavell, Flavell & 
Green, 1983) - 45 months                    
The deceptive box task 
(Hogrefe, Wimmer & 
Perner, 1986) - 45 months                
Unexpected transfer task 
at 48 months           
Combined composite 
measure of ToM 
No 
Maternal sensitivity and 
mind-mindedness (number 
of appropriate mind related 
comments) at 6 months 
and Child verbal mental 
age 
Not related to number of 
older sibs or mothers 
inappropriate mind related 
comments 
Repacholi &Trapolini 
(2004) 
 
Separation Anxiety Test 
(Klagsbrun & Bowlby, 
1976) Seattle Version 
(Slough & Greenberg, 
1990) (53.98) 
Summary scores for each 
SAT dimension sig 
correlated for self and 
other child therefore only 
SAT self scores 
presented. 
2 modified false-belief 
tasks - unexpected 
contents &unexpected 
identity involving mother     
                                                                    
2 standard false-belief 
tasks  - unexpected 
contents (Smarties; Perner 
et al, 1987), unexpected 
identity (peep-hole book; 
Gopnik & Astington, 1988) 
'Causes of emotions' 
interview (Dunn & Hughes, 
1998) involving mother  
(53.98)                             
Yes Age and language related 
to total false-belief score 
35 
 
Emotion understanding/Emotional Theory of Mind tasks 
Summaries of studies investigating emotion understanding/emotional Theory of 
Mind tasks are detailed in Table 5. 
Denham’s Affective Perspective Taking Task 
Five studies (Greig & Howe, 2001; Laible & Thompson, 1998; Ontai & Thompson, 
2002; Raikes & Thompson, 2006, 2008; Waters et al., 2009) used Denham’s 
affective perspective-taking task (Denham, 1986), which Denham (2006) cites as 
having excellent inter-rater reliability and validity. This firstly involves an emotion 
recognition task (showing a puppet with an emotional expression and asking how 
the puppet feels), and then involves identification of the puppet’s feelings in a 
number of vignettes (usually eight). Four main categories of emotion are used; 
happy, sad, afraid and angry; two vignettes are used for each emotion and each 
vignette is scored out of 2 (where 0 is wrong, 1 is correct valence, i.e. picking a 
correctly positive or negative emotion, and 2 is for correct emotion). Thus the 
maximum possible score is usually 16. In one study (Waters et al. 2009), this task 
was scored only for the understanding of negative emotions. Although this task 
clearly relates to emotion recognition, scores are based on identification of how the 
puppet feels in relation to the vignettes (i.e. only the emotion understanding 
component is scored). Children are usually ‘trained’ to recognise the emotional 
expression of the puppet, and thus pure emotion recognition abilities should be 
controlled for.  
 Three studies using Denham's emotion understanding task (Greig & Howe, 
2001; Laible and Thompson, 1998; Raikes and Thompson, 2006, 2008) found a 
significant relationship between performance on this task at 3 to 4 years old, and 
attachment, with more secure children performing better. This was true when 
attachment was measured concurrently at three to four years, with Bretherton and 
colleagues’ (1990) Attachment Story Completion task (Greig & Howe, 2001), and 
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with the AQS (Laible & Thompson, 1998). The same effect was found when 
attachment had been assessed with the AQS over one year earlier (Raikes & 
Thompson, 2006, 2008). When emotional valences were separated, only age 
proved to be a significant independent predictor for positive emotions, but both age 
and attachment were significant independent predictors in understanding negative 
emotions, with more securely attached children better at understanding negative 
emotions (Laible & Thompson, 1998). However, Raikes and Thompson (2008) 
found that once mother-child references to emotion in a semi-structured interview 
were included in the model, attachment security was no longer a significant 
independent predictor; the effects of security on emotion understanding were 
mediated through mother-child references to emotion. 
In contrast to these results, two studies (Ontai & Thompson, 2002; Waters et 
al., 2009) found no effect of concurrent attachment pattern assessed with the AQS 
on performance on Denham’s task, assessed at 3 to 4 years old. Gender and 
maternal discourse style; pragmatism (i.e. confirmations that the child’s emotion-
related talk is right, directions about the ‘proper’ way to respond to an emotion, 
negation/correction of the child’s incorrect emotion-related statement, and repetition 
of the child’s emotion-related talk) and elaboration (i.e. discussion about: the causes 
of the emotions, linking the emotion to events in the child’s life,  requests for 
emotion-related information and the behavioural results of emotions) were related, 
however (Ontai & Thompson, 2002). Girls, and children with mothers who used 
pragmatic discourse, tended to have higher negative emotion understanding scores 
(although this relationship was only marginally significant).  
The lack of a significant association between attachment and emotion 
understanding may be due to the age of participants; children were younger than in 
many studies and at an age where emotion understanding is just developing (Ontai 
& Thompson, 2002). However, at 5 years old, concurrent attachment status was a 
significant predictor of emotion understanding, with more securely attached children 
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having higher total emotion understanding scores and negative emotion 
understanding scores (Ontai  & Thompson, 2002). Age, gender and attachment at 
41 months were not significant predictors of emotion understanding at 61 months, 
however. 
An interaction term between attachment at 41 months and elaborative style 
accounted for a significant amount of additional variance in positive emotion 
understanding at 61 months. For children with less secure attachments, higher 
elaborative discourse style was linked to lower positive emotion understanding 
scores at 61 months. Conversely, for children with more secure attachment styles, 
high elaborative discourse style was linked to better understanding of positive 
emotions at 61 months.   
Conversational tasks 
Consistent with Ontai & Thompson’s (2002) results, maternal use of language was 
also found to be important in other tests of emotion understanding. McQuaid and 
colleagues (2008) assessed the number of appropriate mental state comments that 
3- to 6-year-old children made when in conversation with their mother. The task was 
novel, but results demonstrated good inter-rater reliability. Mothers’ mental state 
language and the child’s attachment status, using observations of mother-child 
separations and reunions, and measured concurrently with emotion understanding, 
were both associated with the amount of mental state talk the child engaged in. 
However, only maternal mental state language was significantly associated with 
children’s expressions of emotion understanding, scored as comments made in 
reference to an emotional state and explanation for that state. 
The two studies which rated emotion understanding from conversations with 
the experimenter (Kidwell et al., 2010; Laible & Thompson, 1998) both found 
emotion understanding to be significantly associated with concurrent attachment 
status, at approximately 4 years old, with more securely attached children 
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performing better. Kidwell and colleagues (2010) found that for both positive and 
negative emotion understanding, children classified as having an insecure-resistant 
attachment relationship, assessed with the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 
1978) displayed less emotional competence than securely attached children, when 
controlling for verbal ability and socioeconomic risk. As previously described, Laible 
and Thompson (1998) summed the score on the affective perspective taking task 
and interviews into one score of emotion understanding.  
Modified false-belief tasks 
Modified false-belief tasks involving emotions were used in two studies (De Rosnay 
and Harris, 2002; Fonagy et al., 1997). De Rosnay and Harris (2002) used the ‘Dog-
Rabbit Test’, in which children were asked to describe the emotional state (happy or 
sad) of the character in response to a scenario, and explain why they were feeling 
that way. They also used a novel analogue to the Dog-Rabbit test, which they 
named the ‘Mother-Infant Separation Test’, which involved an attachment figure. 
Fonagy and colleagues (1997) used the ‘Ellie-the-elephant/Coke-can belief-desire 
reasoning task’ (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews & Cooke, 1989), in which 
children were asked to make and justify two predictions about emotion. The task is 
similar to a task of false-belief, in that a character (Ellie) leaves her favourite drink 
(coke) out and goes for a walk. Her friend Mickey then plays a trick on her, by 
replacing the coke in the coke-can with milk. The child is then asked how Ellie feels 
when she first looks at the coke-can, and then how she feels after she drinks from 
the can. The child is also asked to explain why Ellie feels that way. Interestingly, 
Repacholi and Trapolini (2004) also gave children this task, but as 81% of their 
sample of 4-year-olds failed the task, they did not include the results within their 
analysis. 
Both studies (De Rosnay & Harris, 2002; Fonagy et al., 1997) found that 
concurrent attachment, and more specifically, the attachment dimension of the SAT, 
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was a significant independent predictor of performance in children between 3 and 5 
years old.  
Character/Cartoon-based tasks 
Four papers used tasks involving identifying the emotions and causes of emotions 
of a character (Barone & Lionetti, 2011; Repacholi & Trapolini, 2004 – discussed in 
cognitive Theory of Mind section; Steele et al., 1999, 2002). Steele and colleagues 
(1999, 2002) asked children to identify the emotions of a set of line drawings and 
then choose the appropriate expression to go in a blank face of a character in 
various attachment-related situations (‘acknowledgement of distress’). The children 
were also prompted for possible mixed emotions.  
Steele and colleagues (1999) found that mother-infant attachment pattern, 
assessed with the Strange Situation at 12 months, was significantly positively 
correlated with mixed-emotion understanding at 6 years, but the father-infant 
attachment pattern (also assessed with the Strange Situation) at 18 months was not 
significantly correlated with emotion understanding. Prenatal maternal adult 
attachment security  (i.e the attachment pattern of the mother, assessed prior to the 
birth of her baby, measured with the Adult Attachment Interview; AAI; George, 
Kaplan & Main, 1985) was also significantly correlated with understanding of mixed 
emotions at 6 years old, with more secure mothers associated with better child 
performance on the emotion understanding task. In a regression model involving the 
child’s age, dichotomised mother-infant attachment status and parental adult 
attachment status, only infant-mother attachment was found to be a significant 
independent predictor of emotion understanding (potentially because maternal AAI 
is highly correlated with infant-mother attachment). Conversely, Steele and 
colleagues (2002) found no significant associations between infant-mother 
attachment security at 12 months or infant-father attachment at 18 months, and 11-
year-olds’ ability to acknowledge distress in their emotion understanding task. 
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Maternal AAI security during pregnancy and maternal self-reports of nurturance 
were correlated with these abilities, however.  
Barone & Lionetti (2011) used a validated Italian version of the ‘Test of 
Emotion Comprehension (TEC; Pons & Harris, 2000; validated by Albanese & 
Molina, 2008). Similarly to the tasks described previously, the child is shown a 
picture book with cartoon scenarios, facial expressions and stories about emotions. 
The child is scored on recognition of the facial expression, understanding the 
external causes of emotions, understanding the possibility of regulating emotions, 
and understanding the ability to hide an emotional state. In a group of 3- to 5-year-
old adopted children, those with disorganised attachment patterns, assessed using 
the Manchester Child Attachment Story Task (MCASR; Goldwyn et al., 2000; Green 
et al., 2000), were found to have significantly worse performance on the task of 
emotion understanding (assessed 12 months following attachment assessment) 
than children with other attachment patterns (Barone & Lionetti, 2011). Within 
organised attachment patterns, there were no significant differences between 
securely and insecurely attached children.  However, as this task includes aspects 
of emotion regulation, it may be that attachment status related to this rather than 
emotion understanding per se. Thus, we cannot conclude that there is an effect of 
attachment on emotion understanding for this task.
 
 
Table 5 
Articles Investigating the Relationship between Attachment and Emotional Theory of Mind Tasks 
Paper Attachment Measure 
(age in months) 
Number of Securely and 
Insecurely Attached 
Children (Secure %, 
Insecure %, 
Disorganised % for 
Categorical) 
Emotion Understanding 
Measure (age in months) 
Significant Relationship 
between Attachment and 
Emotion Understanding? 
Other Key Variables 
Associated with Emotion 
Understanding  
Barone & Lionetti (2011) 
Manchester Child 
Attachment Story Task 
(MCASR; Goldwyn, 
Stanley, Smith & Green, 
2000; Green, Stanley, 
Smith and Goldwyn, 2000) 
(12-18m post adoption at 
3.9 years) 
25, 40, 16 
Test of Emotion 
Comprehension (TEC; 
Pons & Harris, 2000) (12 
months after MCASR) 
Yes 
Adopted children < 
normative  sample 
 
 
De Rosnay & Harris 
(2002) 
The Separation Anxiety 
Test (Klagsbrun & Bowlby, 
1976) (60.9) 
Not reported for total 
sample 
False-belief Tasks:                                               
The Dog-Rabbit Test  - 
Mother-Infant Separation 
Test - novel analogue to 
Dog-Rabbit Test. Low and 
high expressed emotion 
versions (60.9)  
Yes 
Verbal Mental Age 
(older>younger) 
Chronological age 
(older>younger) 
Fonagy, Redfern & 
Charman (1997) 
The Separation Anxiety 
Test (Klagsbrun & Bowlby, 
1976) (58) 
For attachment dimension 
score alone - 31.6, 18.4% 
38 & 50% ambiguous 
Ellie the elephant belief-
desire reasoning (Harris et 
al., 1989) (58) 
Yes 
Chronological age          
Verbal mental age (both 
older>younger) although 
both NS once account for 
attachment 
Kidwell, Young, Hinkle, 
Ratliff, Marcum & Martin 
(2010) 
Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth, 1978), coded 
using Crittenden's PAA 
method (54) 
 30, 70 
Emotional competence - 
Abner Emotions Interview 
(54)       
Yes 
Receptive Vocabulary                                                                                 
 
Laible & Thompson 
(1998) 
Attachment Q-Sort 
Version 3.0 (Waters & 
Deane, 1985) (50.4) 
Continuous Scores for 
attachment security. Mean 
= 0.48, SD = 0.15, range = 
.15 - .71 
Affective perspective-
taking task (Denham, 
1986) (50.4) Interview -                                               
Fabes et al. (1988) (50.4) 
Yes - total and negative 
emotion understanding 
Age (older>younger) 
Not gender 
 
 
McQuaid, Bigelow, 
McLaughlin & MacLean 
(2008) 
Videotapes of two-mother 
child reunions and two 
mother-child separations 
coded using Crittenden’s 
PAA method (57) 
58,44 
Child participates in 
scenarios adapted from 
Geneva emotion eliciting 
scenario (Favez et al., 
1994) (57)                                              
Co-construction narrative 
with mother                                 
Consolidation narrative 
with experimenter  
Yes for co-construction, 
although effect smaller 
once account for maternal 
comments on mental state 
No for consolidation 
Maternal comments on 
mental state 
Ontai & Thompson 
(2002) 
Attachment Q-Sort 
Version 3.0 (Waters & 
Deane, 1985) (41.2 & 
60.84) 
Continuous Scores for 
attachment security. Mean 
= 0.43, SD = 0.19, range = 
.02 -.90 (41.2) 
Mean = .37, SD = .17 
(60.84) 
Denham (1986) Puppet 
task (41.2 & 60.84) 
 
No at 41.2 months 
Yes at 60.84 months (only 
attachment at 60.84 
months related, not 
attachment at 41.2 
months) 
Gender (Girls > boys) 
Maternal pragmatic 
discourse (41.2) 
Interaction elaborative 
discourse and attachment 
(60.84) 
Raikes &Thompson 
(2006) 
& Raikes & Thompson 
(2008)  
Attachment Q-Sort 
(Waters and Deane, 1985) 
(28) 
Continuous Scores for 
attachment security. Mean 
= 0.22, SD = 0.25, range = 
-.21 - .75 
Denham’s affective 
perspective-taking task 
(Denham, 1986) (42)  
Videotape and mother and 
child discussing several 
emotional events in the 
recent past (modification 
of Fivush,1991) (42) 
Yes for labelling of 
emotional states 
Yes for emotion 
understanding (although 
not after controlling for 
mother-child references to 
emotion) 
Maternal depression (at 
28m but not 42m) 
Child receptive vocabulary  
Mother-child references to 
emotion 
Steele, Steele, Croft  & 
Fonagy (1999)  
Strange Situation      
Mother (12)               
Father (18) 
 
Mother: 57, 33, 10          
Father: 75, 25 
Disorganised reclassified 
due to small numbers 
The Affect Task - 
assessing understanding 
of mixed emotions (70.7) 
Yes (Mother-infant), No 
Father-infant) 
 
Steele, Steele & 
Johansson (2002) 
Strange Situation  
Mother (12) 
Father (18) 
Mother: 37, 55, 8 
Father: 32, 66, 2 
Modified version of 'Affect 
Task' above (136.8) 
No Maternal AAI at pregnancy 
Waters, Virmani, 
Thompson, Meyer, 
Raikes & Jochem (2009) 
Attachment Q-Sort 
Version 3.0 (Waters & 
Deane, 1985) (54.24) 
Mean = .37, SD = .18, 
range = -.08 - .68  
Denham's affective 
perspective-taking task 
(Denham, 1986). Scored 
only for negative emotion 
understanding (54.24) 
No 
Child avoidance  of 
conversation about 
negative experiences 
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Mixed mind and emotion                             
Two studies (Ontai & Thompson, 2008; Symons & Clark, 2000) used tasks which 
involved a combination of ‘mind’ and ‘emotion’ tasks (Table 6).  
Ontai & Thompson (2008) used a combination of a standard unexpected 
location task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), emotion attribution task (Harris et al., 1989), 
unexpected location task involving the mother and emotion attribution task involving 
the mother. In this study, all of the tasks were combined to create a Theory of Mind 
summary score. Theory of Mind abilities and attachment security (assessed with the 
AQS) were investigated concurrently at 4 years old. Mother-child elaborative 
discourse and mother-child mental state discourse were also assessed. Only 
elaborative discourse proved to be a significant independent predictor of children’s 
Theory of Mind scores. Attachment was neither a significant independent predictor 
of, nor correlated with, Theory of Mind.  
Symons and Clark (2000) gave children three sets of false-belief tasks, 
involving the identity and location of objects and locations of caregivers. In each 
case, both false-belief and emotional justification questions were asked. The 
authors did not find a significant correlation between attachment security (assessed 
with the AQS) and performance on the caregiver location task. They did, however, 
find a positive correlation between performance on the object location task and 
concurrent attachment security (at 5 years old), but not with attachment security at 2 
years old. Neither age 2, nor age 5 attachment security predicted variance in scores 
on the caregiver location task. However, maternal sensitivity and maternal emotional 
distress were significant independent predictors. Children with more sensitive 
mothers, and, interestingly, mothers who were in greater emotional distress when 
children were 2 years old, performed better on the caregiver location task at 5 years 
old. 
 
 
Table 6  
Articles Investigating the Relationship between Attachment and Mixed Cognitive and Emotional Theory of Mind Tasks 
Paper Attachment Measure 
(age in months) 
Number of Securely and 
Insecurely Attached 
Children (Secure %, 
Insecure %, 
Disorganised % for 
Categorical) 
Emotion Understanding 
Measure (age in months) 
Significant Relationship 
between Attachment and 
Emotion Understanding? 
Other Key Variables 
Associated with Emotion 
Understanding  (age in 
months) 
Ontai &Thompson (2008) Attachment Q-Sort Version 
3.0 (Waters & Deane, 
1985) (41.2) 
Continuous Scores for 
attachment security. Mean 
= 0.43, SD = 0.19, range = 
.02 -.90 
Standard unexpected 
location task (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983)                                        
Emotion attribution task 
(Harris et al, 1989)                                                                             
Unexpected location task 
involving mother                                                                         
Emotion attribution task 
involving mother     
                                                                                                                
Yes, for negative emotions 
at 5 years 
No at 3 years. 
Gender girls >boys 
Maternal use of 
elaborative and pragmatic 
discourse 
Symons & Clark (2000) Attachment Q-Sort 
(Waters, 1987; Waters et 
al, 1995) (25.1 & 69.5) 
69.5: Mean = .5, SD = .23, 
range = -0.15 - .93)                   
25.1:  Mean = .42, SD = 
.27, Range = -.13 - 1.07 
False-belief Tasks (69.5) 
3 sets investigating:         
1) Object identity                                                        
2) Object location x 2 - 
from Wimmer and Perner 
(1983) unexpected 
transfer task.                                 
3) Caregiver location x 3 
(modelled after object 
location)   
Yes (object location at 
69.5) 
Maternal sensitivity (25.1) 
No relation to number of 
siblings 
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Discussion 
Summary of findings 
Seventeen out of twenty-one independent studies reported an effect of attachment 
status on emotion understanding.  In general, insecure infant-mother or child-mother 
attachment was linked to poorer performance on emotion understanding tasks. This 
review therefore provides evidence for the Attachment Status Model of the 
development of emotion understanding, as discussed by Harris (1999). However, 
four studies did not find any effect of attachment on emotion understanding, once 
other variables were controlled for (Laranjo et al., 2010; Meins et al., 2002; Steele et 
al., 2002; Waters et al., 2009). Additionally, studies differed in the extent to which 
other variables (such as maternal discourse) moderated or mediated the effect. 
Markedly differing methodologies limit the interpretation of findings. For example, 
studies diverged in attachment measures, emotion understanding measures, 
sample population and ages of children tested. Previous research has demonstrated 
that all of these factors can affect outcomes in attachment studies (see Schneider, 
Atksinson & Tardif, 2001).  
Schneider and colleagues (2001) consider that findings from longitudinal 
studies, spanning developmental stages “provide more convincing support” (p. 89) 
than do concurrent correlations. Of the studies which investigated attachment at 
more than one time point, in some, concurrent attachment demonstrated a stronger 
relationship with emotion understanding than did earlier attachment status (Ontai & 
Thompson, 2002; Symons & Clark, 2000).  When early attachment status has been 
associated with emotion understanding at more than one time point, Steele and 
colleagues (2008) found that early attachment was associated with emotion 
understanding at 6 years but not at 11. However, contrary to this, Ontai and 
Thompson (2008) found that attachment status at 41 months was not associated 
with emotion understanding at 41 months, but was related to the understanding of 
negative emotions at 5 years. Thus, generally, the closer together in time that 
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attachment and emotion understanding are measured, the stronger the relationship 
between the two, although there are exceptions. This is in line with proposals that 
the relationship between attachment and other outcomes may be strongest when 
attachment patterns are measured concurrently with the outcome of interest, rather 
than longitudinally (e.g. Youngblade, Park & Belsky, 2003).  
Where studies separated out performance for positive and negative 
emotions (e.g. Laible & Thompson, 1998; Ontai & Thompson, 2008), some 
demonstrated associations between attachment and negative emotions, some with 
positive and some both. Most studies did not separate out positive and negative 
emotions and therefore it is difficult to disentangle the competing ‘hypervigilance 
hypothesis’ (e.g. Belsky et al. 1996) from the ‘diminished lexicon for emotion 
hypothesis’ (e.g. Steele et al., 2008). Of course, as noted by Steele and colleagues 
(2008), the hypotheses may not be contradictory; insecure attachment patterns may 
be linked to a diminished lexicon for emotion, whereas disorganised attachment 
patterns may be linked to hyper-vigilance for negative emotion. As many studies 
used the Attachment Q-Sort (Waters & Deane, 1985), which does not separate 
attachment patterns, this is also difficult to evidence at present.  
In their 2004 article, Repacholi and Trapolini stated that “whereas the 
findings have been mixed with regards to false-beliefs, the evidence is more 
compelling for a link between attachment and emotion understanding” (p. 399). The 
evidence nine years later looks broadly similar, with tasks of emotional Theory of 
Mind being more often associated with attachment, in comparison to tasks of 
cognitive Theory of Mind. However, few studies looked at both emotion 
understanding and cognitive Theory of Mind within the same study. Those that did, 
found conflicting results. For example, Greig and Howe (2001) found a significant 
relationship between attachment and emotion understanding, but not attachment 
and cognitive Theory of Mind. Conversely, Repacholi & Trapolini (2004) found 
47 
 
significant relationships for both emotion understanding and cognitive Theory of 
Mind. Greig & Howe (2001) comment that “studies on children's social 
understanding tend to assume that understanding the minds and emotions of others 
are theoretically and methodologically indistinct” (p. 381). Our results would suggest 
that future research should consider these to be separable abilities. More studies 
are needed that investigate both cognitive and emotional Theory of Mind within the 
same study (and thus the same sample), to determine whether these aspects do 
relate to attachment differently. 
 
Limitations 
i. Attachment measures 
Some studies used attachment measures which we may assume require some level 
of emotion understanding. Interestingly, within studies using story-stem 
assessments of attachment, null findings were found for tasks of emotion 
recognition (Colle & Del Giudice, 2011) and cognitive Theory of Mind (false-belief; 
Greig & Howe, 2001), and not for tasks of ‘pure’ emotion understanding/emotional 
Theory of Mind. Perhaps, therefore, studies using story completion tasks and 
emotional Theory of Mind tasks (Arranz et al., 2002; Barone & Lionetti; Greig & 
Howe, 2001) were confounded. We would recommend that these results are thus 
treated with caution, and that future studies assessing the relationship between 
attachment status and emotion understanding avoid using story completion 
assessments of attachment. 
Further to issues of attachment measurement, Fraley and Waller (1998) 
explain that the various measures have differing reliability and validity. In particular, 
attachment categories have been shown to have moderate, but not perfect, stability 
across time (correlation coefficient = 0.39; Fraley, 2002). According to Fraley and 
Waller (1998) “the decrease in reliability resulting from categorisation can result in 
high levels of measurement fuzziness and lead researchers to observe patterns that 
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do not exist or to overlook natural patterns that do exist” (p.103). Additionally, as 
categorically insecurely attached children form a small proportion of the general 
population, there is reduced statistical power to detect an effect. Therefore large 
sample sizes are needed to avoid inflation of type II errors (i.e. failure to find an 
effect which truly exists in the population). Accordingly, the type of assessment 
used, and associated sample size, may affect whether a relationship between 
attachment and emotion understanding is found. No studies in this review reported 
a-priori power calculations used to determine sample size. Thus, determining 
whether these studies are fully powered to detect effects is problematic. Indeed the 
sample sizes on the whole appear reasonably small, particularly as in many cases, 
the samples were split into securely attached and insecurely attached groups, and 
given that many papers used numerous correlational analyses within one study. 
Therefore we may posit that some of the results were due to Type I or Type II errors. 
 
ii. Study design 
All studies in this review focused on correlational rather than causational evidence. 
Although many studies are longitudinal, and thus provide more convincing evidence 
of a true link between attachment and emotion understanding, only intervention 
studies can provide such causational data. Research has demonstrated that it is 
possible to alter the relationship between attachment and later outcomes through 
factors such as sensitive parenting (Belsky & Fearon, 2002). These factors can be 
successfully targeted through interventions (Bakermans-Kranenburg, Van 
Ijzendoorn & Juffer, 2003). Thus, measurement of emotion understanding before 
and after an intervention aimed at increasing parental sensitivity (and therefore 
increasing security of attachment) would provide stronger evidence for a direct 
causal link. 
Attempts were made to control for a range of variables, such as verbal IQ 
and maternal depression, both of which have been associated with emotion 
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understanding/Theory of Mind abilities (e.g. Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007; Pons, 
Lawson, Harris & De Rosnay, 2003), however, the use of control variables was 
inconsistent. This is not necessarily due to the quality of the studies, but rather that 
the studies ultimately all had different aims. Some set out to investigate the 
relationship between attachment and emotion understanding as a primary aim, but 
for others this was secondary. Additionally, some studies used novel, or poorly 
validated measures of emotion understanding, and few used blinding procedures. 
These methodological inadequacies, and inconsistent approaches to measurement 
of attachment and emotion understanding, constrain the analysis of findings. The 
literature would thus benefit from larger, well-controlled studies. 
 
Implications  
The relationship between attachment and emotional Theory of Mind/emotion 
understanding is in support of the Attachment Status Model proposed by Harris 
(1999). Further evidence for this model emanates from the fact that the relationship 
between attachment and emotion understanding was seen to remain once children’s 
verbal abilities were controlled for. However, in some cases, the relationship did not 
remain after controlling for children’s verbal abilities. Moreover, the studies reviewed 
have shown that maternal mind-mindedness and maternal mental state language 
may mediate, or perhaps completely account for, the relationship between 
attachment and emotion understanding. This supports Harris’ Psychological 
Discourse Model (Harris, 1999).  
Harris (1999) posits that the models are not mutually exclusive, and 
accordingly attachment pattern and maternal discourse may both make independent 
contributions to the development of emotion understanding.  Indeed, the results in 
this review suggest that a multi-factorial pathway to emotion understanding is likely, 
with attachment and language two of the important contributors.  
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Abstract 
Aims 
This research aimed to develop a novel Electroencephalography (EEG)/Event 
Related Potentials (ERPs) paradigm to measure the neural correlates of children’s 
emotion understanding. The research secondarily aimed to associate ERPs with 
attachment security and socio-emotional competence. 
 
Methods 
Thirty-three six-year-old children, who had had their attachment to their primary 
care-giver profiled at twelve months, completed the EEG paradigm. Mothers also 
completed questionnaire measures assessing the child’s socio-emotional 
competence and executive function.  
 
Results 
A Late Positive Potential (LPP) was found to be associated with emotion 
understanding. The LPP effect was not correlated with attachment status or socio-
emotional competence. 
 
Conclusions 
Emotion understanding appears to share similar neural correlates with cognitive 
Theory of Mind understanding in young children. 
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A recent review of emotional and social competence in children, undertaken by 
Denham (2007), stated: 
 
‘‘children from preschool to the early primary years, who understand emotions, are 
more pro-socially responsive to their peers, show more adaptive social behaviour 
and are rated as more socially competent by teachers and peers alike’’ (p.18). 
 
Consistent with this, a number of studies have found good emotion understanding to 
be associated with many positive outcomes in children, including:  good moral 
reasoning (Lane, Wellman, Olson, LaBounty & Kerr, 2010); positive perceptions of 
social experiences (Dunn, 1995); positive peer relationships (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin 
& Banerjee, 2012) and better educational outcomes (Garner, 2010) in childhood; 
and skills in managing one's emotions, a sense of subjective well-being, and 
adaptive resilience in adolescence (Lau & Wu, 2012). 
Conversely, deficits in emotion understanding have been linked to various 
markers of psychological distress, psychopathology (Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 
2002), and poorer educational outcomes (Garner, 2010) in childhood. Impairments 
in emotion understanding abilities have also been demonstrated in a number of 
specific clinical populations, such as in children with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD; Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008), Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD; e.g. Da Fonseca, Seguier, Santos, Poinso & Deruelle, 2009), and 
maltreated children (Luke & Banerjee, 2012).  
Broadly, emotion understanding is comprised of recognition of emotion 
expression, and knowledge about: the causes of emotions; cues for feelings; 
knowledge of multiple emotions; methods of intentionally using emotion expression 
to communicate with others; and methods of coping with emotions (Garner, 2010; 
Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002).  A narrow definition of emotion understanding is 
the ability to make sense of another person’s emotions based upon contextual 
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information (e.g. Weimer, Sallquist & Bolnick, 2012). Individual differences in 
emotion understanding have been observed in early childhood, remain significant in 
middle childhood, are relatively stable across time, and are seen across multiple 
facets of emotion understanding (see Pons & Harris, 2005, for a review). 
Given the stability of these early individual differences, and the obvious 
importance of emotion understanding to children’s well-being, it is crucial to 
determine the antecedents and developmental trajectory of these skills. However, 
Southam-Gerow and Kendall (2002) argued that ‘‘although … emotion is considered 
a cornerstone of human experience, many current theoretical models … have not 
adequately considered the role of emotion in development and psychopathology’’ (p. 
189). In particular, there is currently a lack of research regarding the neural 
mechanisms associated with emotion understanding in children; a gap that this 
research aimed to address. 
 
Neural activity associated with emotion understanding 
A key neuroscientific methodology particularly suited to paediatric populations is the 
use of Electroencephalograms (EEG; e.g. de Haan & Thomas, 2002). EEG uses 
electrodes placed on the scalp to measure electrical activity in the brain. Sensory, 
cognitive or motor stimuli may be used to evoke changes in the EEG waveform, 
caused by groups of neurons in the same area responding simultaneously (Luck, 
2005, p. 35).These changes are known as Event Related Potentials (ERPs). ERPs 
are ‘time locked’ to specific stimuli. Unlike fMRI, they directly measure neural activity 
and have ‘exceptional temporal resolution’ (Hajcak, MacNamara & Olvet, 2010). In 
addition, the participant sits in an open room with the experimenter and not inside a 
scanner, as in fMRI or MEG, and this methodology is thus generally more 
acceptable for participants, particularly children. 
ERPs are usually named in accordance with the timing of the maximum 
amplitude, and whether they are positive or negative in valence. They are 
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categorised according to timing, morphology, scalp topography and response to 
experimental manipulation (Hajcak et al., 2010). A number of ERPs have been 
associated with emotion processing (see Eimer & Holmes, 2007; Hajcak et al., 
2010; Ibanez et al., 2012; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira & Polich, 2008, for recent 
reviews).  
There is a vast literature on ERPs associated with emotion recognition (e.g. 
Balconi & Pozzoli, 2007; Eimer & Holmes, 2007; Kestenbaum & Nelson, 1992; 
Lang, Nelson & Collins, 1990). Little research has been carried out to assess ERPs 
associated with understanding emotions in context (hereinafter referred to as 
‘emotion understanding’), however. The neuroscientific studies most closely related 
to emotion understanding in children are those investigating Theory of Mind 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978; e.g. Bowman, Liu, Meltzoff & Wellman, 2012; Liu, 
Meltzoff & Wellman, 2009; Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring & Wellman, 2004, 2009; 
Meinhardt, Kuhn-Popp, Sommer & Sodian, 2012; Meinhardt, Sodian, Thoermer, 
Dohnel & Sommer, 2011; Sabbagh, Bowman, Evraire & Ito, 2009; Sabbagh & 
Taylor, 2000). Theory of Mind (ToM) comprises the ability to predict another 
person’s cognitions based on the viewer’s knowledge of the situation or context. 
Similarly, emotion understanding is the ability to predict another person’s emotions 
based on the viewer’s knowledge of the situation or context. ERP studies have 
reliably associated cognitive ToM with the presence of a late, anterior slow wave 
(see Meinhardt et al., 2011 for a review). 
 Consistent with this, Liu, Sabbagh and colleagues (2009) found that during 
a false-belief task, adults, and children capable of understanding Theory of Mind, 
demonstrated the presence of Late Positive Slow waves (LPP) 775 ms - 850 ms 
post stimulus, occurring at left-frontal electrodes.  In their study, children were 
shown film clips of false-belief eliciting stimuli. A cartoon figure was shown to place 
two animals in two different boxes; the character then stands in front of the boxes, 
and the animals are seen to move to different boxes, out of sight of the cartoon 
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figure. The participants are then asked a ‘reality question’ – ‘where is this animal 
really?’ and a ToM (belief) question ‘where does the person think this animal is?’. 
The participants either answered the questions verbally or by pointing.  The 
researchers found an LPP associated with belief reasoning, in adults, and children 
capable of understanding ToM (the children who ‘passed’ at least 75% of trials). 
This effect was not seen in children who did not understand ToM (i.e. who passed 
fewer than 25% of trials), suggesting that the LPP may be a neural correlate of ToM 
processing.  Similar effects of LPP have also been demonstrated in passive viewing 
ToM tasks (Geangu, Gibson, Kaduk & Reid, 2013), which do not require a response.  
Earlier positivity across temporo-parietal areas (around 300 ms after stimulus onset; 
the ‘P3’) has also been associated with belief-reasoning (e.g. Bowman et al., 2012; 
Liu, Meltzoff et al., 2009; Meinhardt et al., 2011; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). 
Additionally, there may be developmental effects on the localisation 
(Meinhardt et al., 2011), and timing (Liu, Sabbagh et al., 2009), of the neural 
response associated with ToM functioning; Liu, Sabbagh and colleagues (2009) 
found that the LPP effect was later and more diffuse in children, compared to adults.  
Meinhardt and colleagues (2011) demonstrated a more posteriorly localised Late 
Positive Complex (LPC) and Late Anterior Slow Wave (LSW; the ‘P3’ ERP) in 
children, compared to adults. They used a standard ToM task of unexpected 
transfer. In this, a character is seen to leave an object in one location. The first 
character then leaves the room, and a second character moves the object to a new 
location. The participant is asked where the first character would search for the 
object. Stimuli varied in two ways; belief and expectation. True belief conditions 
occurred when the first character believes the object to be in the place that it really 
is. Conversely, false-belief conditions occurred when the character believes the 
object to be in a different place to where it really is. Expected conditions occurred 
when the character then searched for the object in the place we assume they 
believe it to be, and unexpected conditions occurred when the character searched in 
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a location incongruent with their presumed belief. False-belief conditions were 
associated with a significantly greater LPC and LSW than true-belief conditions. 
Additionally, unexpected outcomes were associated with a greater LPC over midline 
electrodes than expected outcomes, although there was no reliable effect of 
expectancy on the LSW.  
Brain regions implicated in ToM include the posterior Superior Temporal 
Sulcus (pSTS), Temporo-Parietal Junction (TPJ), temporal poles and the medial 
Pre-Frontal Cortex (mPFC; Frith & Frith, 2006). These areas of activation 
complement ERP findings of LPP (associated with electrodes over prefrontal areas), 
and P3 (associated with temporo-parietal electrodes). This seems to hold true for 
paediatric populations (e.g. Bowman et al., 2012), although there is mounting 
evidence for a decrease in mPFC activation during ToM tasks in adolescents 
compared to adults (Blakemore, 2008). Differences in neural activity (EEG alpha 
waves) in the dorsal medial Pre-Frontal Cortex (dmPFC) and right TPJ (rTPJ) have 
been positively correlated with 4-year-old children’s performance on a Theory of 
Mind task, even when controlling for Executive Function abilities (Sabbagh et al., 
2009).  
Similar regions have been implicated in emotion understanding/affective 
ToM tasks (e.g. Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith & Blakemore, 2009). However, cognitive 
and affective ToM may recruit slightly different neural populations; Sebastian and 
colleagues (2012) found increased mPFC activation in an emotion ToM task 
(inferring how a character would react to their companion’s affective state, based on 
an understanding of their emotions), compared to a cognitive ToM task (inferring 
how a character would react based on an understanding of their companion’s 
intentions or beliefs), in adolescents and adults. In light of the commonalities 
between the two abilities, and the possibly overlapping brain systems (Sebastian et 
al., 2012), EEG studies of ToM provide the best framework for thinking about the 
brain processes that might be engaged in emotion understanding in children.  
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To our knowledge, there has been no research investigating the neural 
correlates of emotional, rather than cognitive ToM understanding in children. 
Therefore, in this study, we aimed to develop and pilot a paradigm to investigate 
emotion understanding in 6-year-old children (the beginning of ‘middle childhood’).  
This age-group was chosen because middle childhood is a key time for social-
emotional development, as children enter a more social world at school and are less 
reliant on their parents (Colle & Del Giudice, 2011). Thus, emotion understanding at 
this age is thus crucial for forming peer relationships. Additionally, this is the age at 
which children can reliably understand and pass ToM tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
The paradigm combines knowledge of Theory of Mind related ERPs and 
Violation of Expectation negativity potentials in EEG with methodology used in a 
previous study of emotion understanding in young children (Steele, Steele & Croft, 
2008; Steele, Steele, Croft & Fonagy, 1999). 
 
Violation of expectation  
A number of studies have consistently shown a negative potential 400 ms post-
stimulus in response to a violation of expectations (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
Typically, this has been found following the presentation of semantically unrelated 
information, such as between two words or between a word and a context (Ibanez et 
al., 2012). However, the N400 has been seen across modalities, and recently has 
been demonstrated in studies of emotion processing. Leuthold, Filik, Murphy and 
Mackenzie (2012) presented adults with sentences describing the context of a 
scenario and the emotional response of a character involved in the scenario. They 
demonstrated an N400 (localised to the anterior temporal lobe), followed by a larger 
frontal positivity (LPP), when the emotional response was incongruent with the 
context. These effects were not seen when the context and emotion matched. The 
authors propose that the LPP ‘reflects high-level mindreading functions’, which 
would be consistent with LPP findings in ToM studies. This again suggests a 
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relationship between neural responses to emotion understanding and cognitive ToM 
tasks. 
 Similarly, Goto, Yee, Lowenberg and Lewis (2013) used a visual equivalent, 
whereby adult participants were presented with a visual scene. A large face was 
then superimposed on the scene. The emotional expression displayed by the face 
was either congruent or incongruent with the scenario. Again, a greater N400 was 
seen for the incongruent scenes in Asian-American participants. The N400 was 
symmetrical across hemispheres and was greatest at midline centro-posterior 
electrodes. Interestingly, the effect was not seen in European-American participants, 
which the authors attribute to reduced attention to social context in this population. 
To our knowledge, there have not been similar studies investigating emotion 
understanding in children, although analogous paradigms have been used to 
investigate cognitive Theory of Mind (e.g. Meinhardt et al., 2011). 
 
Development of the paradigm 
In order to develop a rigorous paradigm that could be used to elicit ERPs in children, 
we modified an existing task used by Steele and colleagues (1999, 2008), which 
investigated emotion understanding in 6-year-olds. In this earlier study, 63 children 
were shown line drawings depicting the 6 basic emotions described by Ekman 
(1971); happy, sad, angry, surprised, disgust and fear; two mixed emotions – 
mischief (happy/angry) and disappointed (sad/surprised); and a neutral face. 
Participants were asked firstly to label the faces (an emotion recognition task). 
Secondly, researchers told the participants which emotion the faces were intended 
to depict.  In the next part of the task, the children were shown cartoon-sequences, 
in which a cartoon character was firstly shown in a scene and with a corresponding 
emotion displayed on their face (e.g. a child with a smiling face holding an ice-
cream). In the next image, the scene changes (e.g. the child has dropped the ice-
cream) and the child’s face is blank, with no facial expression. The cartoon 
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sequences were shown one at a time and the experimenter read an accompanying 
narrative. Finally, the child was asked to choose an emotional face which fitted the 
final scene (i.e. to fill in the blank face) and explain to the experimenter why this face 
was chosen. The experimenter then asked if any other faces would ‘fit’, in order to 
assess the child’s understanding of mixed or ambivalent emotions.   
In the present study, a similar task was used, but the final emotional face for 
each cartoon was provided for the participants, rather than leaving a blank face. 
Similarly to the design employed by Goto and colleagues (2013) for emotion 
understanding in adults, and Meinhardt and colleagues (2011) for belief 
understanding, the emotional expressions were either congruent (e.g. sad that they 
have dropped their ice-cream) or incongruent (e.g. happy that they have dropped 
their ice-cream) with the scene. We anticipated that incongruent emotions would 
elicit a negativity related to violation of expectations (an N400). Furthermore, 
incongruent scenes were expected to evoke a larger Late Positive Potential (LPP), 
and P3, as the child tries to understand the protagonist’s unanticipated emotional 
response. 
 
Association with attachment 
The attachment relationship to the primary caregiver has been posited as one of the 
mechanisms through which emotion understanding is developed.  The concept of 
attachment was first described by Bowlby (1969) as the “lasting psychological 
connectedness between human beings” (p.194). He proposed attachment theory “as 
a way of conceptualizing the propensity of human beings to make strong affectional 
bonds to particular others” (Bowlby, 1977, p. 201).  His theories particularly describe 
the physical and emotional bond between an infant and its primary caregiver, 
usually its mother. Four main attachment patterns have been proposed, which 
describe how an infant relates to its primary care giver: secure, avoidant-insecure, 
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ambivalent insecure (Ainsworth, 1978) and disorganised insecure (Main and 
Solomon, 1990). 
Fonagy and Target (2002) hypothesise that the attachment relationship acts 
as the mechanism through which mental events are appraised and reorganised. 
They hypothesise that secure attachment allows for the development of a capacity 
to ‘mentalise’; i.e to have a mental representation of others’ minds. They further 
posit that “internal states must have meaning so that they may be communicated to 
others and interpreted in others to guide collaboration in love, work and play” 
(Fonagy & Target, 2002, p. 321).  Consistent with this, child-mother attachment has 
been shown to be related to peer relationships in middle-childhood (Schneider, 
Atkinson, & Tardif, 2001). Part one of this thesis reviewed a number of studies 
investigating the relationship between security of attachment and emotion 
understanding. Most found that a more secure attachment was linked to improved 
emotion understanding. In light of these findings, we correlated the results of the 
emotion understanding EEG task with the participant’s attachment pattern to their 
primary care giver. 
 
In summary, this research therefore aimed to: 
1) Develop a task, suitable for 6-year-old children, in which the neural 
activity associated with their ability to predict other people’s emotions (i.e. 
emotion understanding) could be investigated. 
We hypothesised that emotion prediction would result in a negativity (N400) in 
incongruent trials relative to congruent trials. We also predicted the presence of a 
larger Late Positive Potential (LPP), and P3, in incongruent trials relative to 
congruent trials.  
2)  Investigate whether the neural activity associated with emotion 
understanding correlates with children’s social competence at 6 years old. 
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As previous research has identified a positive correlation between children’s 
emotion understanding and social competence, we anticipated a positive correlation 
between neural activity associated with emotion understanding (LPP, N400 and P3), 
and social competence. 
3) Investigate whether the neural activity associated with emotion 
understanding at 6 years old correlates with attachment security to the 
primary care giver at 12 months old. 
We predicted that children who were securely attached to their primary care giver 
aged 12 months would show greater N400 and LPP amplitudes in response to the 
incongruent emotion trials relative to the congruent trials. 
 
Methods 
Setting 
The study took place at a North London Child and Adolescent Mental Health Clinical 
and Research Centre. 
 
Participants 
The sample comprised 47 children (25 males), and their mothers (see Figure 1 for 
flow-diagram of participation). Ages ranged from 69 to 81 months (M = 73.13, SD = 
2.63 months). All child-mother dyads were from a cohort of children who had their 
attachment pattern assessed at 12 months old, using the Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth et al., 1978). We approached all 96 parents of children from this original 
cohort who had given permission for us to do so (a 47% follow-up rate). Initial 
contact was by letter (which included a participant information leaflet; see 
Appendices B, C, and D for study documentation), followed by a telephone call. 
Children with a diagnosed Developmental Disability, including Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD), were excluded from the study. All participants were offered a £5 
book voucher as compensation for their time.  
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Questionnaire data was completed for all 47 participants; however 1 
participant was later excluded due to a diagnosis of ASD (not disclosed until 
participation). Three participants did not complete the EEG task, due to skin 
allergies and/or anxiety about the procedure. Data from an additional 10 children 
were excluded due to excessive movement artefacts or technical errors during EEG 
recordings. This attrition rate is in line with other ERP studies using younger children 
(e.g. Meinhardt et al., 2011). Therefore, the final EEG sample consisted of 33 
children (14 males; mean age = 72.88 months, SD = 2.37 months; range = 69-78 
months; 26 securely attached, 7 insecurely attached).  Participants primarily came 
from white, middle-class families. Full demographic information is detailed in 
Appendix E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of participant recruitment and attrition. 
  
Parent - Child Dyads (n=96) 
  
Did not participate (n=49) 
  
 
  Declined to participate/Moved away  
(n=34) 
  
 
  Could not be contacted (n=15)   
EEG data recorded (n=44) 
  
  
Attempted EEG (n=47) 
  
  
EEG Data Analysed (n=33) 
  
Enrollment   
EEG data not recorded (n=3) 
  
 
  Anxiety  regarding procedure (n=2)   
 
  Skin allergies (n=1)   
  
  
EEG Acquisition   
EEG Pre - Processing   
EEG Analysis   
EEG data excluded (n=11) 
  
 
  Diagnosis of ASD (n=1)   
 
  Fewer than 50% epochs without  
artefacts (n=3) 
  
 
  N oisy on visual inspection and/or  
m ean ERP amplitude greater than 2  
standard deviations from group mean  
(n=7) 
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Power calculations 
Power calculations were performed to aid with decisions regarding sample size. 
Meinhardt and colleagues (2011) found a significant difference in LPP amplitude 
over midline sites between false-belief and true-belief trials in their study assessing 
the neural correlates of Theory of Mind processing, F(1,41) = 20.01, p <.001. To 
detect an effect of this size between ERP amplitude in congruent and incongruent 
trials, at 80% power and 5% significance, 11 participants were required.  
Steele and colleagues (2008) found that the correlation between 6-year-olds’ 
ability to identify emotions with infant-mother attachment was .41. To detect a 
correlation of this size between emotion understanding and infant-mother 
attachment, at 80% power and 5% significance, 44 participants were required. 
Therefore, due to high attrition rates within this population (Meinhardt et al., 
2011 reported a 35% attrition rate in their child participants), we aimed to recruit 70 
participants.   
 
Design 
The study was a longitudinal cohort study involving EEG, behavioural tasks and 
questionnaire measures. It forms part of a joint-submission, with two studies 
undertaken with the same participant group. The present study investigated the 
socio-emotional development of children, and the second study (Carman, 2013) 
investigated the development of control of actions. Please see Appendix A for 
further information regarding the contribution of each trainee to the project. Thus, 
children completed two tasks, with task order counterbalanced over all testing 
sessions. One task, investigating response inhibition, is not reported here. In total, 
each task took approximately 20 minutes and participants were offered a break in 
between tasks.  
Following completion of the two EEG tasks, participants were given a 10-
minute refreshment break. The Story Stems Assessment Profile (Hodges, Steele, 
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Hillman, Henderson & Kaniuk, 2003) was then administered, to provide a concurrent 
measure of attachment pattern. These data were collected as part of a separate 
study, and are not reported presently. Mothers completed questionnaire measures 
whilst their child was completing the EEG tasks. In total, participation took 
approximately 2 hours, including time for informed consent and thorough 
explanation of the study. Researchers were blind to the attachment pattern results of 
the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978) until analysis was undertaken.  
 
Procedures 
EEG task 
EEG methodology was used to investigate neural responses to a socio-emotional 
task. The task was based on a task previously used by Steele and colleagues 
(1999, 2008). The task comprised static cartoon scenes, involving a child character, 
in which a two - or three - scene story would unfold. Audio description of the scene 
accompanied each picture. The final scene involved a child with a 'blank' face. The 
Audio recording asks the participant how they think that child would be feeling. The 
child's facial expression would then be 'revealed' (Figure 2). Participants were 
instructed to stay as still as possible whilst watching the scenes and to think about 
how the cartoon child would be feeling in their heads.  
40 cartoon scenarios were shown; 20 where the target child would be 
expected to experience a positive emotion, and 20 where they should experience a 
positive emotion (Appendix F). Scenes ended with a facial expression that was 
either congruent or incongruent with the scene. There were 10 incongruent negative 
scenes (i.e. scenes that unexpectedly ended with a negative emotion), 10 congruent 
negative scenes (i.e. ended with a negative emotion as expected), 10 incongruent 
positive scenes (i.e. unexpectedly ended with a positive emotion) and 10 congruent 
positive scenes (i.e. ended with a positive emotion as expected).  Scenarios were 
presented in a random order, and each scene was used only once for each 
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participant. Congruent and incongruent versions were created for each of the 40 
scenes. Thus, two versions of the task were created, and counterbalanced so that 
half of the participants viewed the congruent version of a certain scene and half 
viewed the incongruent version of it. This controlled for potential confounding 
factors, such as differences in the basic visual properties of positive and negative 
scenes. 
 
1. ‘Jack and Emily are watching
cartoons after school’
2.’ Mum comes in and te lls Emily
that she has to do her homework
before she can watch TV’
3. ‘So Emily does her homework in the
kitchen whilst her brother watches TV in
the living room. I wonder how she ’s feeling?’
4. (Face revealed – ERP eliciting
stimulus)
 
Figure 2. Example of EEG stimuli. 
 
Participants sat in a dark, sound attenuated room whilst the tasks were 
presented on a computer monitor, situated approximately 41 cm away from the 
participant. The images were approximately 18 cm square, with subtended visual 
angles of 253.74º horizontally and vertically. Each ERP eliciting image (the image in 
which the facial emotion was shown), was presented for 2000 ms, following the 
1. ‘Jack and ily are watching cartoons 
fter school’. 
4. (Face revealed – ERP eliciting 
stimulus). 
3. ‘So Emily does her homework in the kitchen 
whilst her brother watches TV in the living room. 
I wonder how she’s feeling?’. 
. ‘ um comes in a d tells Emily that she 
has to do her homework before she can 
watch TV’. 
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presentation of the same image without a facial expression. The Inter-Stimulus 
Interval (ISI) between scenes within a scenario was 0 ms, and the ISI between 
scenarios was 500 ms (Figure 3). The ERP data were time-locked to the 
presentation of the image in which the facial emotion was shown. Stimuli 
presentation was controlled using the E-Prime 2.0 Software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
 
Attachment pattern at 12 months 
Attachment pattern at 12 months was assessed using the Strange Situation 
(Ainsworth, 1970). In this, a child is placed in various scenarios with a combination 
of their mother and/or a stranger, as follows: 1. Parent and infant alone. 2. Stranger 
joins parent and infant. 3. Parent leaves infant and stranger alone. 4. Parent returns 
and stranger leaves. 5. Parent leaves so infant is alone. 6. Stranger returns. 7. 
Parent returns and stranger leaves. Attachment classifications derived from this 
procedure have been shown to be reliably stable across time (Main, Kaplan & 
Cassidy, 1985), and inter-rater reliability is high; Ainsworth and Bell (1970) found a 
94% agreement between raters.  
 
Tim
e
250ms
Mean = 3800ms
2000ms
250ms
Mean = 4825ms
Mean = 6875ms
ERP eliciting              
stimulus
 
Figure 3. EEG experiment design. 
250 ms 
Mean = 3800 ms 
Mean = 6875 ms 
2 0 ms 
250 ms 
Mean = 6875 ms 
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Electroencephalography (EEG) acquisition and preprocessing 
EEG data were collected and recorded online using Electrical Geodesics, Inc. 129-
channel sensor nets (Tucker, 1993), NetAmps Series 300 amplifier (Electrical 
Geodesics, Inc.) and NetStation software. The data were amplified and sampled at a 
frequency of 250 Hz. An anti-aliasing low-pass filter of 70 Hz was applied during 
data acquisition. 
 
Measures 
Social competence  
Parent-report data regarding children’s social competence was collected using the 
Social Competence Scale – Parent Version (Conduct Problems Prevention Group, 
1995; Appendix G). This is a 12-item scale which comprises 2 subscales: a 
prosocial and communication subscale and an emotional regulation skills subscale. 
Some items from this questionnaire were adapted from the Kendall and Wilcox 
(1979) and Gesten (1976) assessments of social competence. Parents are given 12 
statements, 6 from each subscale, describing behaviours that their child may display 
in a social setting, for example ‘your child can give suggestions and opinions without 
being bossy’ and ‘your child listens to others’ points of view’. These statements are 
rated on a five point Likert scale, according to how well the statement fits the child, 
from 0 (not at all), to 4 (very well). The total scores are summed and averaged 
across the number of responses to give an overall score, and scores for each of the 
subscales.  This measure has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α for 
normative sample = .89), and significant differences on total and subscale scores 
have been demonstrated between normative and at-risk groups (Corrigan, 2003).  
 Additionally, parents completed the full Informant-rated Strengths and 
Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997). This comprises 25 questions, 
with 5 scales, each of 5 items. For each item, parents are given a statement 
describing their child, and asked to score them on scale of 0 (not true), 1 (somewhat 
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true), or 2 (certainly true). For this study, only the ‘prosocial’ and ‘peer’ subscales 
were used, which include items such as ‘my child is considerate of other people’s 
feelings’ and ‘my child has at least one good friend’.  This measure is used widely in 
the United Kingdom, and studies have demonstrated good reliability (mean 
Cronbach’s α = .73; Goodman, 1997), and validity (e.g. Goodman, 2001).  
 
Executive Function 
As Executive Function (EF) has reliably been associated with ToM abilities (e.g. 
Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, Martory, & Annoni, 2011), parents completed the 
Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy & 
Kenworthy, 2000), to allow EF to be added into analyses as a covariate. The scale 
comprises 86 items, covering 2 indices (metacognition and behavioural regulation). 
The metacognition index is further subdivided into five subdomains (monitor, 
organisation of materials, plan/organise, working memory, initiate), and the 
behavioural regulation index can be further divided into emotional control, shift, and 
inhibit subdomains. Each item involves a statement regarding the behaviours of the 
child, which the parents rate according to the frequency of the behaviour (never, 
sometimes, or often). Satisfactory reliability and validity have been demonstrated; 
Cronbach’s α ranges from .80 to .98 (Gioia et al., 2000). 
 
Analysis 
Offline, the EEG data were band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 30 Hz and converted 
to an average reference, using EEGLAB software (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The 
continuous EEG was segmented into epochs between -200 ms and 1500 ms 
relative to stimulus onset. Spline interpolation was carried out on individual channels 
if required. Epochs were excluded from analysis if they met any of the following 
artefact rejection criteria: voltage deviations exceeded ±175 µV relative to baseline, 
the maximum gradient exceeded 150 µV, or activity was lower than 1 µV. 
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Participants were excluded if over 20 epochs (50%) were rejected; 2 participants 
were excluded due to this criteria. See Table 1 for details of electrodes used for 
each ERP component, and Appendix H for map of electrodes. 
ERPs were constructed by separately averaging responses for positive 
congruent, positive incongruent, negative congruent and negative incongruent trials. 
For each ERP average, the average activity in the 500 ms window prior to the 
picture onset served as the baseline. At this stage, participants were excluded from 
analyses if the mean LPP ERP was greater than two standard deviations from the 
mean, or if visual inspection of the data revealed a significant amount of noise due 
to movement or technical error. Data from a further 7 participants were excluded 
due to this criteria, giving a final EEG sample of 33 participants.  
For the final sample, the mean number of interpolated channels was 8.62 
(SD = 4.33; range = 0-13 channels). Across participants, a mean of 86% of trials 
(SD = 12%; range = 61-100%) were retained after filtering and artefact rejections. 
The total number of epochs analysed per condition were: 270 (negative congruent), 
281 (negative incongruent), 241 (positive congruent) and 282 (positive incongruent). 
ERPs were statistically analysed using SPSS General Linear Model software (IBM 
Corp., 2012). ERP data were then correlated with the scores from the Social 
Competence Scale. A repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyse the effect of 
attachment pattern on mean ERP amplitude within each time window. 
 
Ethics 
Full ethical approval was gained from the UCL Research Ethics Committee (ID: 
3594/001; Appendices Ia & Ib).  
 
Results 
Results are presented in three parts. First, data regarding ERPs related to emotion 
understanding are presented. Secondly, in order to control for differences in the 
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basic visual properties of the stimuli, ERPs related to early visual processing are 
reviewed. Finally, the paper presents results regarding the association between 
ERPs and measures of social competence, and ERPs and attachment security.  
ERP data 
As described previously, ERPs were analysed by creating grand average wave-
forms for selected electrodes and time periods, for all four stimulus conditions 
(negative congruent, negative incongruent, positive congruent and positive 
incongruent). Effects of congruency (congruent versus incongruent scenes) and 
emotional valence (scenes expected to end with a positive emotion versus those 
expected to end with a negative emotion) were examined with 2  x  2 (congruence  x  
valency) fully within-subject Analysis of Variances (ANOVAs). Mean amplitudes for 
selected time periods were used in all cases. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
for non-sphericity was applied to p-values associated with more than one degree of 
freedom. Descriptive statistics, along with the selected electrodes for each ERP, are 
outlined in Table 1. Significance is considered at the .05 level.  
 
ERPs associated with emotional/ cognitive ToM processing: P3, LPP & N400 
LPP, N400 and P3 components were firstly investigated, as these have been 
previously associated with emotion understanding and/or ToM (Figure 4). The LPP 
demonstrated significant effects of congruency, F(1, 32) = 27.818, p = <.001, ηρ² = 
.465, but not of  valence, F(1, 32) = .336, p = .566, ηρ² = .01, nor any interaction 
between valence and congruence, F(1, 32) =.316, p =.578, ηρ² = .01.  Analysis of 
the P3 demonstrated no significant effects of valence, F(1, 32) = .318, p = .577, ηρ² 
= .01, congruency, F(1, 32) = .488, p = .490, ηρ² = .015, nor interaction effects, 
F(1,32) = 3.010, p = .092, ηρ² = .086. 
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The N400 demonstrated no significant main effects of valence, F(1, 32) = 
3.200, p = .083, ηρ² = .091; nor congruency, F(1, 32) = .289, p = .594, ηρ² = .009, 
nor interaction effect, F(1, 32) = 3.790, p = .060, ηρ² = .106.  
Topographic maps of the congruence effect (congruent vs. incongruent 
stimuli) are shown in Figure 5, demonstrating significant effects of congruency over 
frontal electrode sites for later epochs (the LPP). 
 
Table 1  
Mean Amplitudes for Selected ERPs 
 
ERPs associated with visual and face processing: N1, P1 
To ensure that the LPP congruency effect was not due to differences in the basic 
visual properties of the stimuli (e.g. contrast), P1 and N1, which are correlates of 
early visual processing, were analysed (Figure 6). The P1 and N1 mean amplitudes 
ERP Electrodes 
Time 
period 
(ms) 
Mean 
negative 
congruent  
µv (SD)  
Mean 
negative 
incongruent  
µv (SD) 
Mean 
positive 
congruent  
µv (SD) 
Mean 
positive 
incongruent 
µv (SD) 
P1 
Right & Left 
Occipital: 65, 
69, 70, 83, 
89, 90 
100-200 
3.325 
(4.562) 
2.984 (4.500) 3.732 (5.573) 1.674 (3.433) 
N1 
Right& Left 
Occipital: 65, 
69, 70, 83, 
89, 90 
200-300 
1.204 
(5.227) 
0.637 (5.799) 2.312 (6.407) -.294 (4.373) 
P3 
Midline 
Parietal: Pz 
(62) 
300-600 
4.628 
(6.612) 
5.361 (6.269) 5.310 (6.015) 3.390 (7.123) 
LPP 
Midline 
Frontal: Fz 
(11) 
700-1495 
1.618 
(6.432) 
5.212 (5.173) .649 (4.77) 5.203 (5.050) 
N400 
Midline 
Central: Cz 
(129) 
300-500 
-.971 
(4.480) 
.273 (3.830) -.800 (6.224) 
-2.733 
(5.192) 
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Negative Congruent        Negative Incongruent         Positive Congruent        Positive 
Incongruent 
Figure 4. Grand average wave-forms elicited for negative congruent, negative incongruent, positive 
congruent and positive incongruent conditions, for ERPs previously associated with emotion 
understanding/ToM. 
 
Time (ms) 
Time (ms) 
Time (ms) 
A
m
p
lit
u
d
e 
(µ
v)
 
A
m
p
lit
u
d
e 
(µ
v)
 
A
m
p
lit
u
d
e 
(µ
v)
 
Cz (129) 
Pz (62) 
Fz (11) 
Stimulus  onset 
Stimulus  onset 
Stimulus  onset 
N400 
LPP 
P3 
84 
 
200-400ms0-200ms
400-600ms
600-800ms
800-1000ms 1000-1200ms
1200-1400ms 1400-1600ms
+5.0 µV
-5.0 µV
A
m
p
lit
u
d
e
 
Figure 5. Topographic maps of the congruence effect, showing mean amplitude differences for 
congruent and incongruent conditions (congruent mean amplitude – incongruent mean amplitude) 
across 200 ms time periods. 
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Figure 6. Grand average wave-forms elicited for negative congruent, negative incongruent, positive 
congruent and positive incongruent conditions, for ERPs previously associated with early visual 
processing.  
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showed no significant effects of congruency, F(1, 32) = 3.284, p = .079 (P1), ηρ² = 
.093; F(1, 32) = 3.455, p = .072 (N1), ηρ²  = .097,  or valence, F(1, 32) = .282, p = 
.599, ηρ² = .009 (P1); F(1, 32)=.008, p = .928, ηρ² < .001 (N1), nor a significant 
interaction between valence and congruency, F(1, 32) = .1.702, p = .201, ηρ² = .05 
(P1); F(1, 32) = 1.557, p = .221 (N1), ηρ²= .046. 
 
Socio-emotional competence & attachment classification: relation to LPP 
The only component related to emotional or cognitive ToM processing 
demonstrating a significant main effect of congruence was the LPP. Therefore, only 
this ERP was investigated further in terms of its relation to socio-emotional abilities 
and attachment classification. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the 
questionnaire measures used to assess socio-emotional competence. 
A 2-way ANOVA was performed to examine the effect of attachment 
classification on the LPP congruency effect (congruency x attachment). Although a 
significant effect of congruency was again demonstrated F(1, 31) = 14.367, p = .001, 
ηρ² = .317, no significant effect of attachment was seen, F(1, 31) = .233, p = .633, 
ηρ² = .007, and there were no interaction effects, F(1, 31) = .172, p = .681, ηρ² = 
.006. 
To examine the relationship between the LPP congruency effect and soci-
emotional competence, questionnaire scores from the Social Competence Scale 
and SDQ subscales were correlated with the mean difference in amplitude between 
congruent and incongruent scenes. Again, there was no association between any of 
the questionnaire measures and the LPP congruence effect. 
Additional analyses 
Previous research has demonstrated age, gender and Executive Function abilities to 
be associated with ToM abilities. These factors were therefore investigated to 
determine the extent to which they were associated with the LPP congruence effect.  
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 A 2 x 2 (gender x congruency) ANOVA demonstrated an overall effect of 
congruence, F(1, 31) = 26.006, p <.001, ηρ² = .456, but not of gender, F(31,1) = 
.006, p =.939, ηρ² = .051, and there was not significant interaction between the two, 
F(31, 1) = 1.083, p = .306, ηρ² = .034. Age and executive function (as assessed by 
the BRIEF total score), were not correlated with the congruence effect (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Questionnaire Measures used to assess Socio-emotional Competence and 
Executive Function and Results of Correlations between Measures and LPP Congruency Effect. 
Outcome 
measure 
Mean score/value Standard 
deviation 
Correlation with 
LPP congruency 
effect 
(incongruent – 
congruent) (r) 
Probability of 
effect 
BRIEF General 
Executive 
Composite* 
51.212 8.433 -.023 .897 
Social 
Competence 
Scale (SCS) 
Mean Total 
2.573 0.502 .018 .920 
SCS Total 30.878 6.030 .028 .920 
SCS Pro-social 
Subscale  
2.900 0.564 .045  .804 
SCS Emotion 
Regulation 
Subscale 
2.240 0.568 -.012 .945 
SDQ peer 
subscale 
0.880 1.193 .103  .568 
SDQ pro-social 
subscale 
8.480 1.544 -.134 .457 
SDQ total 6.940 4.069 -.224 .210 
Age 72.880 2.369 -.174 .334 
* These are T scores 
Discussion 
As with numerous studies investigating the neural processing of cognitive Theory of 
Mind (Meinhardt et al., 2011), this study demonstrated a Late Positive Potential 
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(LPP), over frontal electrodes, associated with emotion understanding. As far as we 
are aware, this is the first study to demonstrate such an effect for emotional, as 
opposed to cognitive, Theory of Mind in children. As hypothesised, the effect was 
greater for incongruent as opposed to congruent scenarios, presumably reflecting 
the increased cognitive capacity required to ‘make sense’ of an emotion that does 
not fit with the context. There was no effect of emotional valence; negative and 
positive scenes were seemingly equally difficult to process. The lack of congruence 
effects in ERPs related to early visual processing suggests that the LPP amplitude 
differences were a genuine effect of congruency, as opposed to differences in the 
visual properties of the congruent and incongruent stimuli. No significant main 
effects of congruency were seen for the P3, nor N400, components.  
 
LPP 
We hypothesise that the frontal scalp distribution of the LPP is related to activity 
within the prefrontal cortex. Although EEG does not have sufficient spatial resolution 
to confirm whether this is the case, previous imaging and ERP source analysis 
research has demonstrated prefrontal activity associated with cognitive ToM 
reasoning (e.g. Liu et al., 2004; Sabbagh et al., 2009). Liu, Sabbagh and colleagues 
(2009) suggested that, in accordance with other research, the LPP elicited from their 
cognitive ToM task was in part related to ‘‘conceptual operations in verbal working 
memory” (p. 324). They also consider that it reflected ‘domain-specific’ ToM-
associated activation, as previous research with tasks with similar working memory 
requirements still found an LPP associated with belief-reasoning, but not with control 
conditions. Similarly, we can assume that congruent and incongruent scenes within 
the present paradigm required similar levels of domain-general processing (such as 
language abilities, and working memory), and thus posit that the LPP effect is 
related specifically to emotion understanding (i.e. understanding the mismatch 
between expected and observed emotions in incongruent scenes). 
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The LPP effect was seen reasonably late within the epoch (from around 750 
ms up to 1200 ms), perhaps reflecting the age of the children we tested. Other 
studies investigating ToM in children have suggested that these effects are later in 
the paediatric population (e.g. Liu, Sabbagh et al., 2009; Meinhardt et al., 2011); for 
example, Meinhardt and colleagues (2011) found the LPP at 600-900 ms for adults 
but between 750-1450 ms for children. This is consistent with other ERP research 
finding longer latencies in children compared to adults (Taylor & Baldeweg, 2002). 
Future research, testing children and adults of a range of ages with the present task 
(as in Meindhardt et al., 2011), would confirm whether this is indeed true for emotion 
understanding. Researchers have suggested that the late and long latency of the 
LPP provides evidence that, contrary to early proposals (e.g. Leslie, 1994), ToM 
understanding is not an ‘automatic’ process, akin to sensory or perceptual 
processing. Instead, it requires more controlled thought processes (Meinhardt et al., 
2011). This study may suggest that emotion understanding, equally, requires more 
controlled processing. However, the LPP within this task is related to understanding 
the mismatch between the expected and observed emotion, and not necessarily the 
initial emotion understanding. Thus, it may be that the understanding of the 
mismatch is not automatic, but the initial emotion understanding is.  
 
P3 
Our research demonstrated a P3, which is also in line with previous studies of 
cognitive ToM (e.g. Meinhardt et al., 2011; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). However, 
previous studies have demonstrated that this is greater in trials of false-belief 
compared to true-belief conditions. Contrary to this, we found no significant 
difference in mean amplitude for congruent and incongruent scenes. Thus, we 
cannot conclude that the P3 relates to emotion understanding in an analogous way 
to cognitive Theory of Mind processing.  Unfortunately, our lack of behavioural data 
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means that we cannot determine whether the mean amplitude of the P3 was 
associated with differences in emotion understanding abilities in the task. 
Our lack of findings may be related to the nature of the paradigm. The P3 
effect has been demonstrated in electrodes over the Temporo-Parietal Junction 
(TPJ), which is complementary to findings of TPJ activation during belief-reasoning 
tasks using fMRI (e.g. Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Sommer et al., 2007). Geangu and 
colleagues (2013) similarly found a P3, but also found no significant P3 effect of 
condition (true-belief versus false-belief) in their study of cognitive ToM. They relate 
this to the differences involved in their passive task, compared to tasks requiring an 
active response (such as in Meinhardt et al., 2011). The authors posit that there are 
differential effects of attentional mechanisms, active questions, and explicit (rather 
than implicit) judgements about mental states (all postulated to involve activation at 
the TPJ), which are present in ‘active’ paradigms, and not within their passive task. 
For example, Meinhardt and colleagues (2011) suggested that, in accordance with 
the theory that the TPJ is involved in the attentional system (e.g. Mitchell, 2008), the 
P3 component represents an active shift in attention; shifting attention from the 
protagonist’s behaviour to the protagonist’s mental representation (e.g. Corbetta, 
Patel & Shulman, 2008). This may not happen in passive paradigms. Consequently, 
the lack of P3 effect in the present task, may similarly relate to the passive nature of 
the paradigm used.  However, the fact that an overall P3 was demonstrated 
suggests that the children were attending to the stimuli. 
Moreover, Liu, Meltzoff and colleagues (2009) found activation over TPJ 
scalp electrodes for belief processing, but not for desire processing, in adults. 
Hence, the P3 may also relate specifically to belief processing (not required in our 
task), rather than ToM more generally. Interestingly, Bowman and colleagues (2012) 
used the same ToM task as Liu, Meltzoff and colleagues (2009), but tested seven- 
and 8-year-old children. They found a difference between belief and desire 
reasoning in neural activation over right-posterior electrodes, but only for children 
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who ‘passed’ the ToM tasks. Accordingly, it may also be that in our total sample, 
some children did not understand which emotion the characters were supposed to 
be feeling (and therefore, had there been a behavioural component, would not have 
‘passed’ the task). This is consistent with Liu, Sabbagh and colleagues (2009), who 
found an LPP effect associated with ToM reasoning, only in adults and children who 
could accurately process ToM tasks. Thus it may be that if we had a behavioural 
measure, and repeated the analysis with only the children who understood the task, 
a P3 congruence effect  may have been present. This evidence contrasts somewhat 
with imaging studies finding TPJ activation in both affective and cognitive ToM tasks 
(Sebastian et al., 2012). However, the caveat of ERP source localisation applies; 
due to poor spatial resolution associated with ERP analysis, we cannot conclude 
whether the P3 component does relate to TPJ activation. 
 
N400 
Our data demonstrated a potential N400, however it was noisy, and there were no 
significant differences between congruent and incongruent scenes, suggesting that 
it was not related to violation of expectation. Although the N400 has been 
demonstrated in numerous studies involving violation of expectation (Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011), the vast majority of studies employed language-based 
paradigms (Ibanez et al., 2012). The one study which found an N400 in relation to a 
visual emotion-based violation of expectation (Goto et al., 2013) had a number of 
flaws. For example, visual inspection of their data demonstrates that it contains a 
significant amount of noise (with the figures already having being smoothed for 
presentation purposes), and the N400 effect does not appear to be distinguishable 
from effects at other time-points. Additionally, the effect was not seen in European-
American participants.  These issues therefore make the validity of their significant 
N400 effect somewhat unclear. It may therefore be that the N400 is related to 
language processes, and that our study reflected abilities unrelated to language. It 
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would be interesting to have controlled for language abilities within the present 
study, especially given that emotion understanding and language have been shown 
to correlate (e.g. Pons, Lawson, Harris & De Rosnay, 2003), and this may be a 
useful direction for future research.  
 
Relationship with socio-emotional competence  
Weimer, Sallquist and Bolnick (2012) suggested that research was needed to 
“examine links between children’s false-belief knowledge…emotion understanding, 
and social relationships’’ (p. 296). Our study found no significant relationship 
between neural correlates of emotion understanding (i.e. the LPP congruence 
effect) and social competence. This may be for a number of reasons; firstly, the 
sample size is relatively small, and accordingly the study may simply be 
underpowered to detect a significant effect. This seems plausible, given that past 
research has found associations between emotional ToM and social competence 
(e.g. Bosacki & Wilde-Astington, 1999). It may also have been related to our choice 
of measure. Bruneau-Bherer and colleagues (2012) cite a number of difficulties 
within the measurement of social cognition in children. These include: a lack of 
external validity, and thus generalisability to real-life scenarios (as discussed 
previously), a lack of coherence regarding definitions of social competence, and lack 
of norms/small sample size associated with measures. They state that “the 
association between performance in experimental settings and everyday social 
functioning, or between performance in an experimental setting and questionnaires 
assessing social skills, is modest at best’’ (Bruneau-Bherer et al., p. 139). The 
measure used to assess social competence in this research ( the Social 
Competence Scale – Parent Version; Conduct Problems Prevention Group, 1995), 
was in part chosen due to its length and ease of administration. It has been 
previously validated with large sample size, and against a control group (Corrigan, 
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2003), but, as far as we are aware, it has not been associated with task 
performance in an experimental setting. 
It could also be that this facet of emotion understanding is not directly related 
to social competence. Although numerous studies have demonstrated a link 
between children’s ability to understand emotions in context, and their social 
competence (e.g.  Caputi et al., 2012; Hubbard & Coie, 1994), no research to date 
has studied this in relation to the specific task used in this research. Hughes and 
Leekam (2004) discussed a similar paradox in the contrast between 3-year-olds’ 
inability to pass false-belief tasks, but success at social interactions in everyday life. 
They comment that “this contrast leads to the question of whether, under this formal 
definition, ‘theory of mind’ has any fundamental significance for children’s social 
competence” (p. 591). They propose that this may be a reason to widen the 
definition of theory of mind, for example to cover perception of emotion. Perhaps the 
specific aspect of emotion understanding within this task is not related to social 
competence? Additionally, it may be that this task is not assessing emotion 
processing, but rather important aspects of the information processing required for 
emotion understanding (such as attention). Individual variation in these aspects may 
be unrelated to competence in emotion understanding.  
Finally, there may have been a ceiling effect operating, meaning that all of 
the children were easily able to understand the emotions within the task. Previous 
research has demonstrated that 3-year-old children are able to determine whether a 
character in a story will feel happy or sad, depending on the situation, and can 
understand external causes of emotions (e.g. Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Salmon et al., 
2013; Yuill & Pearson, 1998), therefore our sample, at six-years-old, may have all 
found the task relatively easy. However, there were no such ceiling effects within the 
studies on which the paradigm is based, even though the children within those 
studies were older (Steele et al., 1999, 2008). Additionally, Sebastian and 
colleagues (2012) found that adolescents and adults were less accurate at an 
93 
 
affective ToM task than they were on a cognitive ToM task; they suggest, therefore, 
that affective ToM is more difficult than cognitive ToM. Thus, although a ceiling 
effect within the EEG task is possible, it seems unlikely. 
Ceiling effects were not seen within the measures of social competence, but 
there was limited range within the scores. In particular, the Social Competence 
Scale (Conduct Problems Prevention Group, 1995) score is calculated by computing 
a mean; the resulting scores thus varied between 1.7 – 3.9. This may not be enough 
variation to detect a relationship between this and the LPP congruence effect. 
However, a similarly non-significant result was obtained when the total score was 
instead used, which demonstrated greater variation. 
A celling effect within the EEG task (i.e. a potential lack of variation in the 
children’s level of understanding of the emotional scenes) may also explain the lack 
of association between age/Executive Function (EF), and the LPP congruency 
effect, which may have been expected from past research (e.g. Aboulafia‐Brakha et 
al., 2011; Denham et al., 2012; Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy & Kliegel, 2013). 
Conversely, it could be argued that although cognitive ToM tasks implicitly require 
EF abilities, as a child must inhibit their own perception of reality in order to process 
another person’s perception of reality, this is not necessarily the case with our 
emotion understanding task; a child could base their prediction of the emotional 
consequence using their knowledge of how they themselves would react. Thus there 
may be alternative explanations to a ceiling effect to explicate the lack of association 
with EF. 
 
Relationship with attachment 
Preliminary analyses showed no relationship between the LPP congruence effect 
and attachment security, although the study was underpowered to detect such an 
effect; there were only seven insecurely attached children within the sample. Small 
numbers of children with insecure attachments may be common within attachment 
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research, and thus Type II errors are likely (Fraley & Waller, 1998). The use of a 
dimensional measure (such as the Attachment Q-Sort; Waters & Deane, 1985), 
rather than a categorical measure, may be preferable in future research.  
 
Limitations 
The passive nature of this task is both a strength and a limitation. Whilst a lack of 
response reduces the risk of movement artefacts, and allows for the efficient 
presentation of sufficient numbers of stimuli for ERP analysis in young children, it 
also means that no behavioural data was collected directly from the task. We thus 
had no objective measurement of emotion understanding. This would have enabled 
further analysis into issues regarding potential ceiling effects, or differences in the 
ERPs of children who understood the task, versus children who did not. It would 
thus be interesting for future research to associate task performance with another 
measure of emotion understanding (such as the widely used Affective Perspective 
Taking Task; Denham, 1986), as well as perhaps implementing a response option 
into the main task itself.  
 A further limitation relates to the use of ERP methodology. Whilst EEG has 
high temporal resolution, it is limited by low spatial resolution. Consequently, scalp 
distribution of activity does not allow direct inference of the localisation of underlying 
neural activity. Studies using fMRI, MEG, or ERP source localisation procedures are 
thus needed to relate these processes to brain regions. 
Finally, as previously stated, this study was underpowered to detect a 
relationship between attachment status and emotion understanding abilities. A 
larger sample size is therefore required. 
 
Implications 
The primary aim of this research was to create a paradigm suitable for examining 
the neural correlates (specifically ERPs) of emotion understanding in young 
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children. The results demonstrate that it is possible to obtain ERPs related to 
emotion understanding from a passive viewing paradigm, as in recent adult studies 
of cognitive ToM (e.g. Geangu et al., 2013). This paradigm has a number of 
benefits; firstly, as no response was needed, there was less movement inherent 
within the task, and thus fewer artefacts. Consequently, the data obtained were 
relatively clean, and we were able to keep a larger number of trials than is common 
within similar ERP studies of young children (e.g. Liu, Sabbagh et al., 2009). As a 
result, this paradigm has proven to be particularly suitable for use within the 
paediatric population.  
Furthermore, researchers have often cited the lack of ‘realism’ in tasks 
investigating aspects of social cognition, including emotion understanding (e.g. 
Bruneau-Bherer, Achim & Jackson, 2012, p. 139). This task has arguably higher 
external validity in comparison to other tasks of emotion understanding, as it looks at 
emotions related to context. This is in contrast to tasks which involve, for example, 
inferring mental states from facial expressions alone (e.g. the ‘Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes’ task; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001), or 
superimposing large faces on unrelated background scenes (e.g. Goto et al., 2013). 
Consequently, we might expect it to be more related to emotion understanding 
abilities in ‘real life’, where context plays a key role in one’s understanding of an 
emotion (e.g. Barrett, Lindquist & Gendron, 2007).  
The effect within the Late Positive Potential has previously been seen within 
many Theory of Mind studies (Meinhardt et al., 2011). This therefore suggests that 
similar processes are involved in understanding other people’s emotions in context, 
and understanding other people’s thoughts in context. In some ways, this is intuitive; 
both implicitly involve understanding another’s mind (e.g. Dunn, 1995). However, 
there is significant debate regarding both the extent to which cognitive processes 
involved in ToM and emotion understanding overlap, and the timelines of their 
development. For example, young children’s ability to understand the external 
96 
 
causes of emotions has been positively correlated with knowledge of false-beliefs 
(Guajardo, Snyder & Petersen, 2009). Longitudinally, research suggests that in very 
young children (3-4-year-olds) emotion understanding both develops earlier than 
cognitive ToM, and that early emotion understanding is a predictor for later cognitive 
ToM abilities (O’Brien et al., 2011). However, cross-sectional studies of older 
children, using more complex reasoning tasks, have found that 4-6-year-olds are 
better at predicting another person’s actions, as opposed to their feelings (de 
Rosnay, Pons, Harris & Morrell, 2004). Imaging and lesion studies also suggest that 
slightly different areas are involved within emotional ToM and cognitive ToM tasks 
(e.g. Poletti, Enrici & Adenzato, 2012); the medial Pre-Frontal Cortex (mPFC) is 
particularly implicated in emotional ToM (e.g. Leopold et al., 2012; Sebastian et al., 
2012).   
O’Brien et al (2011) state that ‘there remains a lack of clear empirical 
evidence … on how the two constructs [emotion understanding and Theory of Mind] 
are related over time in development’’ (p.1075). Weimer and colleagues (2012) echo 
this sentiment; “further research is needed in order to understand the relation 
between these distinct aspects of social cognition and to clarify how young 
children’s understanding of belief relates to both specific and broad emotion-
understanding abilities” (p. 280).  We would thus anticipate that our task could be 
used alongside ERP tasks of ToM, to better understand the relationship between the 
neural correlates of these abilities.  
  An improved understanding of the relationship between emotion 
understanding and theory of mind would allow focus on interventions targeted at 
improving emotion and social competence and decreasing behaviour problems and 
psychopathology, such as the  ‘emotion-based prevention program’ investigated by 
Izard and colleagues (2008).  
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Conclusions and avenues for further research 
In summary, this is the first research of its kind to successfully investigate the neural 
correlates of emotion understanding in young children. Initial results suggest that 
similar neural processes are involved when undertaking emotion understanding and 
cognitive ToM tasks. Specifically, we found the presence of a Late Positive Potential 
(LPP), associated with understanding emotions in context.  
Future research should employ both emotion understanding and cognitive 
ToM tasks, to further understand the neural processes underlying these related 
concepts. Additionally, imaging studies that are able to localise the neural responses 
would be beneficial, in order to ascertain whether these facets of ToM recruit similar 
brain regions. Furthermore, measures of language ability, and well-validated 
measures of social competence would support research into how these abilities 
relate to the neural correlates of emotion understanding. As this is the only study to 
investigate ERPs related to emotion understanding in young children, replication 
would strengthen the reliability and validity of the findings (Button et al., 2013).  
In addition to enhancing knowledge of the development of emotion 
understanding in typical development, there are numerous potential avenues for 
clinically relevant research using this paradigm. In particular, the paradigm could 
prove useful for investigating the neural correlates of emotion understanding in 
clinical populations known to have deficits in this area, such as children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders (ASD; Golan et al., 2008), Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD; e.g. Da Fonseca et al., 2009), and maltreated children (Luke & 
Banerjee, 2012). For example, it would be interesting to compare the neural 
correlates associated with this task in children with neurodevelopmental disorders, 
with those found in typically developing populations. We may hypothesise that 
children known to have a deficit in emotion understanding would demonstrate a 
smaller effect of congruency in the LPP, than those who find emotion understanding 
comparatively easier. Similar research investigating the neural correlates of emotion 
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recognition, as opposed to understanding, has demonstrated this type of effect. For 
example, Dawson, Carver, Meltzoff, Panagiotides, McPartland and Webb (2002) 
used an EEG paradigm to compare ERPs in three to four year old children with 
ASD, and typically-developing control children, when viewing faces. They found that 
whilst the typically developing children demonstrated differences in ERP amplitudes 
when viewing photographs of their mother’s face compared to an unfamiliar face, 
children with ASD did not show this effect.  
Studies have also used ERPs as predictors of likelihood of future 
impairment. For example, Guttorm, Leppänen, Poikkeus, Eklund, Lyytinen & 
Lyytinen (2005), found differing patterns of ERPs in infants at risk of familial 
dyslexia, compared to a control group, which were also associated with later 
language and neurocognitive outcomes. In a similar way, the present paradigm 
could potentially be used to identify children at risk of developing later difficulties in 
emotion understanding, and who may benefit from intervention in the area.  
It is also possible that this paradigm could be used as an outcome measure; 
the task could be given prior to, and following an intervention designed to improve 
emotion understanding. For example, Bauminger (2002) developed an intervention 
designed to improve social-emotional understanding in children with autism. Again, 
we may expect that a larger LPP congruency effect would be demonstrated post-
intervention compared to pre-intervention. A review of ERPs in clinical research 
(Duncan et al., 2009) stated that ‘the relationships between ERP measures and 
clinical interventions for developmental disorders have barely begun to be explored’. 
This is therefore an exciting new opportunity for advances in our understanding of 
the neural mechanisms of therapeutic interventions.  
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Part 3: Critical Appraisal 
External validity in EEG research 
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As a psychologist interested both in development and in neuroscience, this research 
appealed on a number of levels. My final placement within a paediatric 
neuropsychology service has demonstrated the importance of brain-behaviour 
relationships; that is to say that it is the impact of brain processes on behaviour that 
is important. I was therefore keen for this research to translate into behaviour in the 
‘real-world’. However, there were a number of difficulties faced in achieving this aim.  
These related primarily to the development of the paradigm, selection of measures 
and methodological issues endemic to EEG research. 
 
Developing an externally valid paradigm 
As expected for research that has a primary aim of developing a paradigm, a 
number of hurdles had to be overcome within the development phase. EEG 
research typically isolates components of an aspect of cognition. Within research 
investigating facets related to emotion understanding, this has often meant that 
studies have separated out small aspects of emotion understanding. For example, 
the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & 
Plumb, 2001) focuses on emotion recognition. Conversely, ‘real-world’ emotion 
understanding involves piecing a number of cues together, and understanding 
another’s emotion in relation to a context (e.g. Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).  Therefore, 
we set out to develop a paradigm that used context, and that was as close to 
emotion understanding in real-world situations as possible. 
The largest issues in designing such a paradigm came hand-in-hand with our 
chosen participant population - 6-year-old children. As with most neurophysiological 
methodologies, EEG requires that the participant sits extremely still, so as to 
minimise noise within the data. Unfortunately, this is not an ability for which 6-year-
olds are well known. Thus the aim of developing an externally-valid paradigm had to 
be compromised with the inherent difficulties of EEG research in this population. 
112 
 
To obtain Event Related Potentials (ERPs), a number of trials have to be 
completed and neural responses then averaged. This means that ERP studies can 
quickly become rather boring; a feature that we were keen to minimise in our study. 
An engaging task would be more likely to hold the attention of a 6-year-old child and 
stop them wriggling quite so much. However, even the most engaging task would be 
unlikely to hold the attention of a young child for longer than 20 minutes. This issue 
was compounded by the fact that the children were also completing a task for a 
second study. We thus faced the challenge of creating an externally-valid, 
reasonably quick, engaging task, during which a child would sit still enough for clean 
data to be collected. 
We initially started with the researcher reading out the text of the story; 
however, the children would turn towards her (even with constant prompts not to) 
and thus the data were too noisy. The same occurred when the researcher asked 
the participant what the cartoon child would be thinking. We also considered the 
possibility of having two response options that the child could click from; a happy 
and sad face, as in Steele and colleagues (1999, 2008) and Goto and colleagues 
(2013). We made the decision that this would extend the time taken to complete the 
task and thus was not feasible in this setting. In addition, the extra movement 
occurring whilst the child moves the mouse would again increase the noisiness of 
the data.  
The decision instead to make this task a passive viewing task was not taken 
lightly. Adding some sort of response has the obvious advantage of collecting 
behavioural data. It would also enable behavioural data more closely related to the 
EEG data to be correlated with attachment status. Thus, this would have enhanced 
the possibility of finding a relationship between neural activity and behaviour, and 
consequently the external validity of the ERP results.  
Goto, Yee, Lowenberg and Lewis (2013) used a similar paradigm which 
successfully integrated behavioural data. They used scenes from the International 
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Affective Pictures System (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008), superimposed with 
emotional faces selected from Matsumoto and Ekman (1989). Participants had to 
press one button if the face they viewed was happy, and another if it was sad. 
Accuracy and reaction time were then recorded. Although the scenes used would 
not have been suitable for young children, this type of behavioural data would be a 
useful addition to future research of this kind. However, Goto and colleagues’  
(2013) task appeared to have little in the way of face validity or external validity. In 
their task, large faces were simply superimposed on the background scene. 
Conversely, in our task, the faces were part of the scene, as they would be in real 
life scenarios. Thus it could be argued that our task had higher external validity.  
Behavioural data was similarly collected by Meinhardt and colleagues (2011) 
in their study of ERPs related to Theory of Mind in children. In their study, children 
were shown film clips of false-belief eliciting stimuli. A cartoon figure was shown to 
place two animals in two different boxes; they then stand in front of the boxes and 
the animals are seen to move to different boxes. The participants are then asked a 
reality question – ‘where is this animal really?’ and a Theory of Mind question ‘where 
does the person think this animal is?’. The participants either answered the 
questions verbally or by pointing. The reality questions acted as control questions, in 
order to ensure that the participants were paying attention. If a participant did not 
correctly answer the reality control question, then they were presented with the 
stimulus again. We had no such method in our study of ensuring the children were 
both paying attention and understood the scenes. Again, such a paradigm would 
have been helpful for our study, but increases the length of the study and requires 
that children move and/or talk in order to respond, which may have increased noise 
within the data. However, the presence of a P3 ERP suggests that they were 
attending to the stimuli. 
The final paradigm achieved was thus a compromise between making the 
task externally valid and as engaging as possible, whilst keeping it short and 
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minimising the impact of noise on the data. In general, it worked well; children 
appeared to enjoy it and the data was of a fair standard. There were a couple of 
shortfalls, however, which would be useful to address in future research. One arose 
because of the randomisation of the stimuli. The task crashed on a couple of 
occasions, but because the stimuli were fully randomised, we could not start blocks 
again, as the same stimuli may have been presented. Given that the point of the 
study was that children would have to make inferences about emotional states, the 
results would be redundant if the child had seen the emotional state previously. 
Therefore, pseudo-randomisation would be helpful in future studies.   
A shortfall within the research was that it could be argued that parts of the 
development phase were missed out. We had originally planned to pilot the task 
with adults and then with a small number of 6-year-old children, but due to issues 
beyond our control, we did not have the time to do this. As this did not happen, this 
research can be considered to be in itself a pilot study. It was interesting to note 
though, that a couple of children tested were unable to stay quiet and instead chose 
to provide a running commentary of the task to the researcher. In particular, they 
would voice their disagreement when the facial expression was incongruent with the 
scene. Many others (including some of the parents) commented in the break that 
they did not understand the cartoon child’s expression for some scenes. This is 
encouraging and suggests that the participants did understand the scenes and that 
the expressions were appropriately assigned. Again, the lack of behavioural data 
means that we cannot conclusively say that the children did understand the task, but 
the significant ERP findings related to the congruence effect, along with this 
qualitative information, are good indications that they did. 
It would have been extremely useful to have trialled each of the scenarios 
with both adults and children; firstly this would have allowed us to refine the 
scenarios and use only those which were understood by the majority of people. 
However, we were keen for the scenarios not to be ‘too’ easy, as this would be likely 
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to create a ceiling effect and thus minimise the likelihood of finding any differences 
in the attachment groups (as indeed we found). Secondly, this would have allowed 
us to see whether an N400/LPP was produced. However, given that the point of 
power calculations is to give an estimate of the likely number of participants needed 
to observe an effect, if an N400/LPP was not seen in a small pilot sample, this does 
not mean that one would not be produced across a larger sample.  
 
Analysis 
Creating an externally valid paradigm led to difficulties in the process of analysis. 
Button and colleagues (2013) reflect on this issue of ‘vibration of effect sizes’ in 
relation to small, underpowered studies in neuroscience. They explain that there are 
numerous differences in the methodologies and analysis techniques employed by 
neuroscience researchers, even when using the same overarching techniques. 
These differing methodologies will thus produce differing results and corresponding 
effect sizes. One such difference in methodologies of ERP studies is the issue of 
electrode selection; as each electrode will relate to different neural activity, the 
selection of electrodes for analysis has a major impact on the results of the study. 
However, there are no explicit rules for electrode selection (Ibanez and colleagues, 
2012). This is particularly challenging for the present study as no such research has 
been carried out before, and thus determining ‘Regions of Interest’ was not easy. 
The study was partly exploratory and as such we examined a number of different 
electrodes. However, as in any psychological research, ERP analysis is based on 
statistical techniques, and therefore are subject to inflation of Type I error if 
numerous tests are used.  The same is true for other neurophysiological (non-ERP) 
research, as discussed by Button and colleagues (2013). Thus, ideally, specific 
Regions of Interest would be documented before analysis.  
We did identify Regions of Interest prior to the beginning of the research, 
however this proved difficult due lack of past research on the subject of the neural 
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correlates of emotion understanding.  The problem is compounded by a lack of 
clarity in the literature regarding the precise mechanisms and component processes 
involved in emotion understanding. Even when taking a narrow view of emotion 
understanding as the ability to make sense of another person’s emotions based 
upon contextual information (e.g. Weimer, Sallquist & Bolnick, 2012), this ability is 
based upon other skills. For example, Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz and 
Levkovitz (2010) suggest that cognitive Theory of Mind, cognitive empathy and 
emotional empathy are prerequisites for emotional Theory of Mind (i.e. emotion 
understanding). Each of these may be related to separate neural activation, and 
lesion studies have demonstrated that they are indeed separable abilities within 
defined neural areas (see Sebastian et al., 2012 for a review). Therefore, we might 
expect that our paradigm may have caused neural activation related to all of these 
aspects of emotion understanding. 
Figure 1. The relationship between emotion understanding (‘affective Theory of Mind - ToM’), cognitive 
ToM and empathy, from Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz & Levkovitz (2010). 
 
Although early research using simplified stimuli may have activated only one 
of these systems, more recent naturalistic research such as ours (which we would 
argue has greater external validity), likely activates a number, and each interacts 
with the other (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). For example, the task employed in this study 
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involved not only hypothesising about another’s internal emotional state, but also 
emotion recognition. It also required some level of cognitive Theory of Mind, 
regarding another’s desires, beliefs or intentions. Therefore, we could have 
investigated electrodes linked to any or all of these factors. However, this would 
have massively inflated the chances of a Type I error.  
The final choice of electrodes was based on the studies with paradigms most 
similar to the present design, however there were very few studies on which to base 
these on. Even within one aspect of emotion understanding, such as cognitive 
Theory of Mind, regions of interest and selected electrodes vary, and they can be 
different for different populations (for example Meinhardt and colleagues, 2011, 
found different regions of activation in children compared to adults). As there are few 
studies within this area, selecting electrodes/Regions of interest was particularly 
difficult. Consequently, it may have been that had different Regions of Interest been 
chosen, different results would have been demonstrated. Thus, to summarise, 
creating an externally valid paradigm created difficulties with interpretation. 
 
Defining emotion understanding: Literature review and measure selection 
Definitions of social and emotional competence vary widely, and this created 
problems in defining both the scope and search terms for the literature review, and 
issues in measure selection within the empirical paper. As we did not collect 
behavioural data from the EEG task, for reasons outlined previously, it was 
important to obtain a good measure of social-emotional competence, again, so that 
we could relate brain activity to differences in behaviour. As definitions of social-
emotional competence vary, so too do measures of the concept. We wanted a 
measure that showed high external validity; i.e. that was related to meaningful 
differences in behaviour, as per Foster and Richey’s (1979) behavioural definition of 
‘socially competent behaviour’ as “those responses, which, within a given situation, 
prove effective, or… maximise the probability of producing, maintaining or 
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enhancing positive effects for the interactor” (p. 626). As with other aspects of the 
study, the measure chosen represents a compromise between quality and quantity. 
The questionnaires needed to be as short as possible, particularly as parents were 
already completing a large battery of longer questionnaires as part of the second 
research study. Shorter questionnaires also have the benefit of being easier to 
answer and therefore parents were less likely to make errors in their completion.  
Regrettably, the well-validated and reliable parent measures of social-
emotional competence were long and/or costly. However, we chose our primary 
measure (the Social Competence Scale; Conduct Problems Prevention Group, 
1995; Appendix G), on the basis of high face validity; it appeared to report on 
meaningful social behaviour, as well as being freely available, quick to administer 
and easy to complete. Unfortunately, the results from this measure were unrelated 
to ERPs from the task. As discussed within the main paper, this could be due to a 
number of reasons. Although finding a relationship between the EEG task and the 
measures of social-emotional competence would have increased our argument that 
our task shows good external validity, the fact that we did not find an effect does not 
suggest the opposite.  
Similarly, obtaining a meaningful definition of emotion understanding was 
key to the literature review, and caused some difficulties in defining the search 
terms. Good external validity means that the results are generaliseable to the 
external world. Arguably, creating clear-cut distinctions between highly related 
concepts is somewhat artificial, and therefore would reduce the external validity of 
the findings. We thus set out for the scope of the search to be as broad as possible.  
For example, cognitive Theory of Mind tasks are arguable not strictly tasks of 
emotion understanding. However, there is huge potential overlap between emotion 
understanding and cognitive Theory of Mind; both involve an understanding of 
another’s mental state, the difference being that one is cognitive and the other 
emotional. Hughes and Leekam (2004) cite numerous research studies that 
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demonstrate a link between various facets of social – emotional understanding and 
false-belief comprehension. These overlaps led to the decision that tasks of 
cognitive Theory of Mind should be included within the literature review. In practice, 
this meant that our reviewed spanned a large range of studies. Although this 
increases our confidence that we have captured the relevant papers within the area, 
it also meant that the review needed to tie together information from what turned out 
to be disparate studies with somewhat contradictory findings, in a meaningful way. It 
might have been easier, for example, to exclude studies that investigated purely 
cognitive Theory of Mind. Again, attempting to increase external validity led to 
difficulties with interpretation of the results. 
 
Conclusion 
To summarise, the main issues reported in this appraisal centre around the 
difficulties of designing research with high external validity. As with many aspects of 
research this is a balancing act. Increasing external validity improves generalisability 
to the outside world. However it can lead to considerable difficulties interpreting 
results, especially when considering a wide-reaching concept such as emotion 
understanding. Only good replication will enable researchers to be more confident 
that any significant results are the results of a true effect, and not spurious findings. 
Thus, replication of our study is crucial, especially given that at present, this is the 
only study of its kind.  
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Appendix A: Trainee contributions to the joint project 
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 Study design, including EEG task development and measure selection, was 
undertaken individually. 
 Applications for ethical approval, development of consent forms and 
information leaflets, overall study protocol, recruitment, testing and data 
entry were undertaken jointly. 
 Data analysis and write-ups were undertaken individually. 
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Appendix B: Initial participant contact letter 
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Appendix C: Participant information sheet 
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Appendix D: Participant consent form 
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Appendix E: Full demographic information of sample 
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All demographics taken at phase 1 of the study (i.e. when children were 12 months 
old) 
 
 
Mother’s Ethnicity 
Ethnicity Frequency (% of EEG sample) 
White British 13 (39.4) 
British 7 (21.2) 
White European 8 (24.2) 
Mixed 2 (6.1) 
Anglo Chinese 1 (3.0) 
Anglo Indian 1 (3.0) 
White Other 2 (6.1) 
 
Mother’s Marital Status 
Status Frequency (% of EEG sample) 
Married & Co-habiting 19 (57.6) 
Unmarried & Co-habiting 12 (36.4) 
Single 2 (6.1) 
 
Mother’s Level of Education 
Level of Education Frequency (% of EEG sample) 
A-levels 2 (6.1) 
NVQ 1 (3.0) 
HNS 3 (9.1) 
BA/Bsc 20 (60.6) 
Masters/PhD 7 (21.2) 
 
Household Income 
Income (£ per annum) Frequency (% of EEG sample) 
Not stated 4 (12.1) 
<10000 2 (6.1) 
20000 – 30000 5 (15.2) 
40000 – 50000 6 (18.2) 
>50000 16 (48.5) 
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Appendix F: Transcript of EEG task instructions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
You are going to be looking at some cartoons with boys and girls in. All I want you to do is 
listen to the story that I’m telling you and look at the pictures that go with the story. 
 
At the end of the story I’m going to ask you what you think the boy or girl is thinking. I don’t 
need you to tell me, I just want you to think about it in your head. Shall we have a practice? 
 
Show the first one. 
 
If they don’t understand what they’re supposed to be doing, explain again. It’s important that 
they are not moving or talking when the emotion is ‘revealed’ so they need to know that they 
just need to think about it in their heads. 
 
The number on the scene corresponds to the number of the scripts below. 
 
Positive 
1. Apples 
a) Alex wants an apple, but he can’t reach 
b) Dad lifts him up and helps him reach an apple 
c) Now  Alex has an apple, I wonder what he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
2. Birthday Present 
a) Adam is in a toy shop with his mum. He sees a teddy he likes 
b) It’s Adam’s birthday. He starts to unwrap a present and it’s the same bear. I 
wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
3. Book Shelf 
a) Ben wants a book from the shelf, but he can’t reach because it’s on the top 
b) Dad reaches the book down for Ben 
c) Ben has the book and starts to read it. I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
4. Crisps 
a) It’s break time at school and Anna, Adam and Penny are eating their snacks. 
b) oh no! Penny tripped and dropped her crisps 
c) Adam shares his crisps with Penny because she doesn’t have any left. I wonder 
how she’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
5. Cut head 
a) Charlotte has cut her head 
b) Dad gives her a plaster to put on it 
c) Then they sit down on the sofa together . I wonder how Charlotte’s feeling? Shall  
we see? 
 
6. Dad comes home 
a) Amy is waiting for Dad to come home 
b) She sees him through the window 
c) Dad is home! I wonder how Amy is feeling? 
 
7. Flowers 
a) Catherine has bought mum some flowers for her birthday 
b) she gives them to mum. I wonder how Catherine’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
8. Football 
a) Tom and Emma are playing football 
b) Tom kicks the ball towards the goal 
c) Tom has scored a goal! I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
9. Gold Star 
a) Olivia is working hard at school 
b) Her work is so good that her teacher gives her a gold star to say well done 
c) Olivia comes out of school and shows mum her gold star. I wonder how she’s 
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feeling? Shall we see? 
 
10. Jigsaw 
a) Jack and Grace are  doing a jigsaw together, there is a piece missing 
b) Jack finds the missing piece and it fits! I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
11. Joining game 
a) Joshua is watching some other children at school playing a game. He is sitting 
alone on the bench 
b) Oliver sees that Joshua is all by himself. He decides to ask Joshua to join in the 
game 
c) Joshua is playing the game too now. I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
12. Plant 
a) Jessica has planted a seed with mum. She waters it to make it grow. 
b) Jessica keeps watering it, but four weeks later it still hasn’t grown! 
c) Then in three more weeks, the seed has started to grow! I wonder how Jessica is 
feeling? Shall we see? 
 
13. Race 
a) Harry is lining up for a race at sports day 
b) He is coming first, I wonder how he is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
14. Rain 
a) Sam wants to play outside, but he looks outside and it’s raining. 
b) He decides to put on welly boots 
c) He goes outside and plays in the puddles. I wonder how Sam is feeling? Shall we 
see? 
 
15. Home time 
a) George is at school. It’s nearly time to go home 
b) Now it is home time, George picks up his bag and coat 
c) George goes to meet with Dad outside. I wonder how George is feeling? Shall we 
see? 
 
16. Skates 
a) Liz is learning to rollerskate. At first she needs to hold mum’s hand because it is 
difficult and she feels a bit wobbly. 
b) But after some practice, she lets go of mum’s hand and skates really fast. I wonder 
how Liz is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
17. Savings 
a) Jess is saving up for a new toy. She puts her birthday money into her piggy bank 
b) After a while, Jess decides to see how much money she has. She thinks she has 
enough for her toy now. 
c) Jess does have enough money, so she goes to the toy shop to buy her toy. I wonder 
how Jess is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
18. Two player game 
a) Jill is playing with her dolls. There are two dolls but she doesn’t have a friend to play 
with. 
b) Then Jill’s brother asks if he can play 
c) Jill lets her brother play. I wonder how Jill is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
19. Netball 
a) Emma is watching her friends play netball. 
b) Her friend Kate scores a goal. I wonder how Emma is feeling now? Shall we see? 
 
20. Coin 
a) Ollie is walking home from school 
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b) He spots something in the ground 
c) It’s a gold shiny coin! I wonder how Ollie is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
Negative 
 
21.Bike 
a) William is cycling 
b) Oh no! He’s hit a rock and fallen off! I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
22. Biscuits 
a) Daniel wants a biscuit, but dad tells him he can’t have one until after dinner 
b) Daniel decides to get one anyway, when his dad isn’t looking 
c) But Daniel comes back and catches boy getting a biscuit. I wonder how Daniel is 
feeling? Shall we see? 
 
23. Broken dinosaur 
a) Charlie and Emily are playing with their toy dinosaurs 
b) Charlie has broken the dinosaur. I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
24. Broken vase 
a) Mum is watching Ellie put some flowers in a vase on the table 
b) But when Ellie is reaching over, she knocks the vase and it smashes. I wonder how 
Ellie is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
25. Building blocks 
a) Katie and Megan are playing together. Their teacher brings them some blocks to 
play with 
b) Katie and Megan try to build towers. Katie builds a really big one, but Megan is 
finding it more difficult. She can only manage to build a little tower. 
c) Their teacher comes back and asks them to show her the towers they have built. 
Megan shows the teacher her smaller tower. I wonder how she is feeling? Shall we 
see? 
 
26. Burnt cake 
a) Jake is making a cake with his dad. They are stirring the mixture together. 
b) Dad puts the cake into the oven to bake 
c) Dad pulls the cake out of the oven, but it has burnt. I wonder how Jake is feeling? 
Shall we see? 
 
27. Bus 
a) Hannah is late for school. She is running for the school bus. 
b) Oh no! Hannah has missed the bus. I wonder how she is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
28. Dad leaving 
a)  Dad is leaving to go away with work. Amy says goodbye to him 
b)  Amy watches him from the window. 
c)  I wonder how Amy is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
29. Negative Dinosaur 
a) George wants to wear his dinosaur costume for school 
b) He puts it on himself, but dad says he has to wear school uniform 
c) George puts his school uniform on. I wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
30. Empty Juice 
a) Luke has some juice. He puts it on the table whilst he goes to find his sandwiches. 
b) But whilst he goes to find the sandwiches, Millie picks up the juice and drinks it 
c) When Luke comes back for his juice, he finds that girl has already drunk it all. I 
wonder how he’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
31. Football 
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a) Ryan and Freya are playing football 
b) Ryan kicks the football but it goes over the fence. 
c) The ball lands in the garden next door. I wonder how Ryan is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
32. Homework 
a) Daisy is watching TV with her brother. 
b) Mum comes in and tells girl that she has to do her homework before she can watch 
TV. 
c) So Daisy does her homework in the kitchen whilst her brother watches cartoons in 
the living room. I wonder how Daisy is feeling? 
 
33. Ice cream 
a) Holly is eating ice cream 
b) Oh no! Holly has dropped her ice cream. I wonder how she’s feeling? Shall we see? 
 
34. Lost Balloon 
a) Callum has a balloon. He got it from a birthday party. 
b) But he lets go of the balloon by accident 
c) The balloon flies into the sky and boy can’t reach it. I wonder how Callum is feeling? 
Shall we see? 
 
35. Lost dog 
a) Joseph is walking his dog with his mum 
b) The dog starts to run away 
c) Joseph drops the lead and the dog runs away. I wonder how he is feeling? Shall we 
see? 
 
36. Mum busy 
a) Poppy is drawing on the floor of the kitchen. It’s time for her baby sister’s dinner. 
b) Poppy finishes her drawing. She takes it to show mum. 
c) She tried to show mum but mum is too busy feeding the baby. I wonder how poppy 
is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
37. Mum on phone 
a) Rebecca is painting a picture at school. 
b) She is really pleased with her picture, so she takes it home to show mum 
c) She tried to show mum, but mum is too busy on the phone to look. I wonder how 
Rebecca is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
38. Mum sick 
a) Bethany is playing on the floor when mum comes in and says she has a headache 
b) Mum has to go to bed, so girl has to go upstairs to play. I wonder how Bethany is 
feeling? Shall we see? 
 
39. Sandcastle 
a) Liam is building a sandcastle. 
b) He turns the bucket upside down 
c) Then he lifts the bucket up. But the sandcastle breaks and falls down. I wonder how 
Liam is feeling? Shall we see? 
 
40. Spilt paint 
a) Phoebe and Eleanor are painting pictures at school. 
b) Phoebe goes to get some paper 
c) Eleanor reaches for some more paint. But she knocks the paint over Phoebe’s 
picture. I wonder how Eleanor is feeling? Shall we see? 
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Appendix H: Map of electrodes 
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